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The air transport industry is at present in a similar position
to that occupied by the railroad industry early in the last century.
It is a new method of commercial intercourse, seeking to establish
itself upon a firm financial foundation. One of the greatest ob-
stacles to that end is contingent tort liability, for increased speed
and mechanization of transportation have been consistently accom-
panied by an increased capacity for accidents. , Safety has been a
less important consideration than the tapping of new markets by
rapid extension of facilities. It is only natural that a new device
or machine first be made to work before it be made to work safely
-although the airlines of this country have made tremendous
progress in increasing the safety of air travel.
When the railroads faced the possibility of substantial tort
liability and realized that it would take time to reduce travel risks
to a minimum-a minimum which, at best, could never be absolute
-it became essential to devise other than mechanical methods to
avoid or limit that liability. The same problem now confronts
the air transport industry. The obvious solution of the problem
was, and still is, to shift the risks of travel, in whole or in part,
from the shoulders of the transporter to those of the transported.
The railroads attempted to do so by contract, and air carriers are
doing the same thing now.
It is the purpose of this study to determine whether such a
method is legally feasible and, if not, what other methods may be
employed to obtain the desired result. It will be necessary to ex-
amine the rules developed in the railroad cases for they are being
carried over to a considerable extent in cases involving aviation.
From the railroad cases it will be apparent that the courts have
frowned on the attempt to avoid or reduce liability to paying pas-
sengers-with whom this study is primarily concerned. If it can
be demonstrated that the reasons for the attitude taken in the rail-
road cases are not compelling, it may be that courts can be induced
*An individual study made in conjunction with the AIR LAW INSTITUTE.
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to look more leniently upon restriction of liability contracts in air
passenger tickets. Finally, the legislative method remains open
and will require examination.
To thoroughly consider the subject of limiting airline liability,
the liability for goods carried should be discussed. It is believed,
however, that the factors applicable to passengers and goods are
sufficiently distinct to allow a study of either alone. For reasons
of space, this study then is concerned primarily with the question
of avoiding or limiting liability for physical injuries to passengers,
and it will be assumed that the airlines dealt with are common
carriers of passengers.1
II. THE RAILROAD CASES.
Liability of Common Carriers of Passengers:
There is a well-defined distinction in the law between the lia-
bility of a common carrier of goods and a common carrier of pas-
sengers. 2 As to goods, the liability is said to be that of an insurer,
that is to say, it is absolute, except for acts of God and of the
public enemy. As to passengers, the care required is not so great.
To the obvious sneer that the law thinks more of property than
of life, the answer given is that the carrier cannot control pas-
sengers as it can chattels; the former are mobile, the latter im-
mobile.3 The economic burden on the carrier would be too great
if it were held to insurer liability as to passengers, who are not
subject to complete control. The formulas used in the .passenger
cases vary from the ordinary prudent man instruction to some
more varied statements, emphasizing the fact that defendant is a
common carrier and must use some greater measure of caution,
that its liability exceeds the usual mean. Thus some courts go
to the extent of requiring an exercise of "extraordinary diligence" ;4
or the degree of care to be used may "be measured by the dangers
which attend the carriage, dictated by the utmost care and pru-
dence of a very cautious person";6 or "it is liable for the utmost
1. 'For liability to persons on the ground, see Kingsley & Gates, "Liability
to Persons and Property on the Ground," 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 515 (1933).
This article also will not treat of avoiding liability by insurance, except
incidentally; see Ball, "Compulsory Airplane Insurance," 4 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 52 (1933).
2. According to the Georgia court, "common carrier" refers only to com-
mon carriers of goods, at common law: Central of Goa. Ry. v. Lippman, 110 Ga.
665. 36 S. E. 202 (1900). This distinction in definition between "common
carrier" and "common carrier of passengers" is well to keep in mind in reading
the statutes, though most statutes include as common carriers both carriers
of goods and of passengers.
3. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Lippman, ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Smith v. New York Central Rd,, 24 N. Y. 222 (1862), opinlun of
Wright, J.
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care and vigilance consistent with the character and mode of con-
veyance, but it need not take every possible precaution."" It is
well settled that the same measure of liability extends to gratuitous,
as to non-gratuitous passengers.7  The fact that a greater quantum
of care is required in these cases than in ordinary tort situations,
together with the old idea of degrees of negligence have caused
many courts and legislatures to express the liability of common car-
riers of passengers in terms of slight, ordinary and gross negli-
gence, or wilful and wanton, or reckless, or criminally negligent
conduct.8 Though many courts have repudiated this method of
statement because of its cumbersomeness, and its practical ineffi-
ciency for trial purposes," many more still use it, and in some
cases a difference in the rules concerning tort liability contracts
results. In some cases, the degrees of negligence theory is re-
pudiated as far as slight, ordinary and gross fault is concerned,
but it is retained to the extent of distinguishing between ordinary
and wilful or wanton wrongdoing;10 here also a difference in the
rules concerning exemption and limitation contracts may result.
Description of the Railroad Cases:
Whatever may be its method of expression, a stringent rule
of liability exists against common carriers of passengers, and they
have attempted to avoid it by contract. Though railroads were
not, of course, the only kind of common carrier during the forma-
tive period of the rules to be discussed, the overwhelming num-
ber of cases are railroad cases, and emphasis will therefore be put
on the problems of that particular industry. The situations in
which attempts have been made to secure exemption from liability
may conveniently be described as falling into two groups, in each
of which the contracts assume somewhat common form. There
are, (1) the cases of passengers for full fare and for reduced
fare, passengers for consideration other than monetary,"1 and
6. Rogers v. Kennebec Steamboat Co., 86 Me. 261, 29 A. 1069 (1894).
7. Ibid.
8. Walther v. South ern Pac. Co., 159 Cal. 769, 116 P. 51 (1911) ; Louisville
& Nashville Rd. v. Brown, 186 Ky. 435, 217 S. W. 686 (1919) ; Missouri, K.
& T. Ry. v. Zuber, 76 Okla. 146, 184 P. 452 (1919-the distinctions between
degrees of negligence are inevitable).
9. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 357 (1873-in any case, the degree
of negligence for which liability attaches Is that which the situation demands,
and sh6uld be called simply "negligence ;" different situations require different
degrees of care) ; Griswold v. N. Y. & N. E. Rd., 53 Conn. 371, 4 A. 261 (1885) ;
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Hamnler, 215 111. 525, 74 N. E. 705 (1905) ; Jacobus
v. St. P. & C. Ry., 20 Minn. 125 (1873).
10. New York Central v. Mohney, 282 U. S. 152, 40 S. Ct. 287 (1920)
McCree v. Davis, '280 Fed. 959 (C. C. A.-6, 1922) ; Chicago, R. I. & P. By.
v. Hamler, cit. note 9.
11. For example, passes to employees to use In getting to their places of
employment. Harris v. Puget. Sound Blec. Ry., 52 Wash., 289, 100 P. 838
(1909); Railway Co. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655 (1877-plaintiff inventor of a
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gratuitous passengers. The method of attempted immunization in
these three cases was simply to print on the ticket or pass a clause
providing that the bearer agreed to assume the risk, and that the
company should not be liable for injuries or. death, however caused.
The wording in the various cases differs, but the idea expressed is
typical.12 (2) The second group includes the carriage of drovers
of livestock, caretakers of vegetables, etc., express messengers, Pull-
man porters, news agents, and circus employees riding in their
employers' cars. In the drover and caretaker cases, the men are
sent along to care for the chattels shipped; their passage is almost
always denominated gratuitous, but most courts hold that considera-
tion is given for them, not only by their fare being included in the
freight rate, but also by their performance of services which the
railroad would otherwise have to do.1 3 Express messengers are
employees of the express companies, and ride and perform their
duties in the express cars. Pullman porters, similarly, are em-
ployees of the Pullman company, and perform their duties in cars
owned by that company and leased to the railroads. News agents
are employees of companies which usually have exclusive licenses
to sell magazines, candy and the like articles on the trains. The
circus cases are unique; circuses own their own cars in which to
transport their equipment, animals and employees; the railroads
merely supply the motive power for hauling the circus cars. 4 The
exemption agreements in these six types of cases are very similar.
Usually the parties enter a tripartite system of contracts. The rail-
way company and the employer agree that the latter will hold the
former harmless against any liability that it may incur as to the em-
ployee because of negligence or otherwise. - The employer and
employee contract that the latter assumes all the risks of transpor-
tation, ratifies any contracts between the employer and the carrier
as to liability to him, and agrees to execute a release to the rail-
way company, or agrees to reimburse his employer any sum which
the latter may have to pay to the railway company if the carrier
has to pay the employee." It is rare that the employee contracts
car-coupling device, given a pass to Montreal, where he was to demonstrate his
invention).
12. Many states require signatures, and the railroads usually also required
that formality. Many states, also, construe the clause very strictly; thus in
Mynard v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. Rd., 71 N. Y. 180 (1877), the clause read
"from all claims, demands, and liabilities of every kind whatsoever." This
was held not to include negligence; 4psissmts verbis are required.
13. New York is an exception to the general rule, holding as it does that
drovers are free passengers.
14. The relation between thed carrier and the circus has been variously
defined. It has been called a towage contract: Baltimore & Ohio S. W. By.
v. Voigt, 79 Fed. 561 (C. C. Ohio, 1897--dictum) ; and a lease of trackage rights
and motive power: Oiough v. Grand Trunk Ry., 155 Fed. 81 (C. C. A.-6.
1907).
15. A typical drover's contract states that the shipper will indemnify and
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directly with the carrier, 8 though often the latter issues a pass to
him, containing an exemption tlause.Y1
Most of the situations just described can have little direct ap-
plication to air transportation. It is not customary (if it has ever
happened) for a caretaker to accompany freight shipped by air.
Airlines furnish their own stewards and do not carry express mes-
sengers. Nor, of course, do they tow circuses. Thus, only the
passage for hire and the gratuitous cases are directly applicable.
But on the other hand, the exigencies of the discussion require a
description of all these cases. The courts have not sharply dis-
tinguished between all the situations; in other words, the rules with
which we are concerned have been developed in all the railroad
cases, as a unit or, rather, as two units. Complete conception of
the field and understanding of the rationalizations about to be
examined could not be had without a knowledge of their factual
background.
Validity of Exemption From Liability Contracts:
There is a respectable split of authority in regard to the
validity of contractual exemptions and limitations of liability. The
majority views are such as to admit of a logical classification of
save harmless the carrier from all claims and liabilities of every kind by reason
of personal injury sustained by the drover. The drover signs a "release"
providing that he voluntarily, assumes all risks of injury, and releasing the
carrier from all claims on account of such injuries.
In a Pullman porter contract, the porter assumes all risks of accident, and
releases the Pullman Company from all claims from liability on account of
such injuries or death; he states his knowledge of the contract between his
employer and the railroad wherein the former agrees to indemnify the latter
against liability to himself, and he ratifies that contract, agreeing further to
indemnify his employer against any liability to which it might be subject
under such contract; and he releases the railroad from all claims for liability
on account of his injury or death.
16. An Indiana statute raised a difficult problem in this regard: §7082a(Burns, 1901), providing, inter alia, that contracts between employer and em-
ployee to release third parties from liability for their negligence to the employee,
were void. The case involved a circus employee, who had entered the typical
arrangement, but on trial set up the statute to avoid his contract with the circus.
He had no contract with the railroad company. The court held that decedent
by entering the employment "in a modified sense made himself a party to the
contract [between the employer and the railroad]. So far as it was the
decedent's contract, it was with the railroad company." It therefore did not
fall within the terms of the statute: Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Rd. v. Henry,
170 Ind. 94, 83 N. E. 710 (1908). The holding is questionable. At the most,
the decedent entered into a third party beneficiary contract with his employer,
and it is that very type of contract that was condemned.
17. Sometimes the arrangement is only bipartite. It may be, for example,
only between the railroad and the employer. In such case, although the juris-
diction would otherwise hold the exemption valid, it may be held to be of no
effect in the particular controversy: Sager v. No. Pac. Rjy., 166 Fed. 526 (C. C.
Minn., 1908-employee is Justified in assuming that his employer will protect
his rights, in absence of notice of the exemption) ; Kansas City, M. & B. Rd.
v. So. By. News Co., 151 Mo. 373, 52 S. W. 205 (1899-suit on the indemnity
clause by the railroad; tacit assumption of liability to the news agent);
Western Md. Ry. v. Shatzer, 142 Md. 274, 120 A. 840 (1923-same). Or the
contract may be merely between the employer and the employee: Shannon's
Adrn. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Rd., 104 Va. 645, 52 S. E. 376 (1905--distinguishing
Voight case, q.v. Appendix, Federal) ; Peterson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. By.,
119 Wis. 197, 96 N. W. 532 (1903-makes no difference; good third party
beneficiary contract).
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the fact situations into two groups. (1) In those cases in which
the carrier is performing its duties as a common carrier (or to
put it more graphically, where the passage is for a consideration),
the majority forbid either exemption from or limitation of liability.
]n this class fall passengers for hire and for special consideration,
drovers and caretakers. (2) In the second group of cases, the
carrier steps outside of its character as a common carrier, it is
said, and may thus, under the majority rule, contract as a private
carrier. Exemptions or limitations, therefore, as to express mes-
sengers, Pullman porters, news agents, circus employees, and those
travelling gratuitously are usually held valid. Thus if a case holds
that an exemption on a ticket bought and paid for is void, it is a
safe guess that the same jurisdiction will hold an exemption on a
drover's pass void. And if an exemption in an express messenger's
contract is held good, one in a porter's contract will probably also
be given effect. These statements are not always true, but in the
great majority of jurisdictions, if the language and reasoning of
the opinions can be trusted, the cases will work out in the way
suggested.'8
These rules have been settled for quite a long time. The lead-
ing cases were decided in the middle of the last century, and al-
most all of the other cases were adjudicated sometime before the
end of that century or early in this one. It seems a musty task
indeed to stir up problems long ago settled. But re-examination
of old principles is sometimes very necessary, and becomes so now
when they are being carried over into aeronautical law It may
be said in advance that the old principles to be here examined are
not wholly impeccable.
The leading case is Railroad Company v. Lockwood.' It in-
volved an accident to a drover who was on the train by virtue of
the ordinary drover's exemption contract. This exemption the Su-
18. For detailed treatment of each Jurisdiction, see Appendix. Applying
the rule of thumb suggested, I have reached the following count, which cannot
be considered entirely accurate, but if liberal allowances are made, is approxi-
mately so Allowing Forbidding Doubt-
Exemption Exemption ful
Passengers for consideration ................. 4 30 15
Drovers and caretakers ...................... 4 29 16
Gratuitous passengers ........................ 24 11 14
Express messengers ......................... 19 8 22
Porter, news agent, and circus employee ...... 20 8 21
The four states allowing exemptions as to paying passengers are Cali-
fornia, Montana, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. The result, in these states, is
dictated by statute, and in all of them, gross, wilful and wanton negligence are
excluded from the statutory rule. This same reason also explains the drover
and caretaker cases, except as to New York, which is the only Jurisdiction
holding a drover to be a gratuitous-passenger.
19. 84 U. S. 357, at 378 (1873).
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preme Court of the United States held void. After a lengthy view
of the authorities, the court said:
It is a favorite argument in the cases which favor the extension of the
carrier's right to contract for exemption from liability, that men must be
permitted to make their own agreements, and that it is no concern of the pub-
lic on what terms an individual chooses to have his goods carried . . . Is it
true that the public interest is not affected by individual contracts of the kind
referred to? Is not the whole business community affected by holding such
contracts valid? If held valid the advantageous position of the companies
exercising the business of common carriers is such that it places it in their
power to change the law of common carriers in effect, by introducing new
rules of obligation.
The carrier and his customer do not stand on a footing of equality. The
latter is only one individual in a million. He cannot afford to higgle or
stand out and seek redress in, the courts. His business will not admit such
a course. He prefers, rather, to accept any bill of lading or sign any paper
the carrier presents; often, indeed, without knowing what one or the other
contains. In most cases, he has no alternative but to do this, or abandon his
business. . . . The [carrier] business is mostly concentrated in a few
powerful corporations, whose position in the body politic enables them to
control it. They do, in fact, control it, and impose such conditions upon
travel and transportation as they see 'fit, which the public is compelled to
accept
Contracts of common carriers, like those of persons occupying a fiduciary
character, giving them a position in which they can take undue advantage
of the persons with whom they contract, must rest upon their fairness and
reasonableness. . . . But the proposition to allow a public carrier to abandon
altogether his obligations to the public, and to stipulate for exemptions that
are unreasonable and improper, amounting to an abdication of the essential
duties of his employment, would never have been entertained by the sages of
the law. . . . When they ask to be excused for negligence-an excuse so
repugnant to the law of their foundation and to the public good-they have
no longer any plea of justice or reason to support such a stipulation, but the
contrary.
The court did not exhaust all the reasons advanced in the
decisions. A few more quotations will complete the picture. The
following is found in Smith v. New York Central Rd. :20
The state is interested not only in the welfare, but in the safety of its
citizens. To promote these ends is a leading object of government. Parties
are left to make whatever contracts they please, provided no moral or legal
obligation is thereby violated, or any public interest impaired; but when the
effect or tendency of the contract is to impair such interest, it is contrary
to public policy and void. Contracts in restraint of trade are void because
they interfere with the welfare and convenience of the state; yet the state
has a deeper interest in protecting the lives of its citizens. It has manifested
20. 24 N. Y. 222, at 231 (1862).
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this interest unmistakenly in respect to those who travel by railroads. Her
policy, and the uniform policy of the law has been, in regard to the safety
of the citizen who has recourse to this dangerous mode of travel, upon a
road and by agencies over which he has no control to hold the carriers to
the exercise of the utmost foresight even as to possible dangers, and the
utmost prudence in guarding against them. This policy is dictated both by
a desire to protect the citizen, and because the public is interested in his
safety. . . . It is said that the passenger should be 'left to make whatever
contract he pleases; but, in my judgment, the public having an interest in
his safety, he has no. right to absolve a railroad company to whom he com-
mits his person from the discharge of those duties which the law has en-
joined upon it in regard for the safety of men. [The effect of such con-
tract,] if sustained, would obviously enable the carrier to avoid the duties
which the law enjoins in regard to the safety of men, encourage negligence
and fraud, and take away the motive of self-interest on the part of such
carrier, which is perhaps the only one adequate to secure the highest degree
of caution and vigilance.
In Russell v. Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Rd.,2 1 the court said:
The fundamental reason, however, for holding common carriers . . .
liable for the results of their negligence, notwithst.anding contracts exempt-
ing them therefrom, is that the state has granted them privileges which they
exercise for the benefit of the public; in return for these, the common car-
rier impliedly undertakes to use due care and diligence in the transportation
of both goods and passengers. This being a main inducement for the grant
of its special rights, the carrier cannot by any special contract, rid itself of
the burden of responsibility, which is one of the conditions of its creation.
. . . In Cleveland etc. Ry. Co. v. Curran, 19 Ohio St. 1, at page 12, the
court says: "It cannot be denied that pecuniary liability for negligence pro-
motes care; and if public carriers in conducting their business can graduate
their charges so as to discharge themselves from such liability, the direct
effect will be to encourage negligence by diminishing the motives for dil-
igence."
Finally, the summation made by a Massachusetts court is
significant :22
The powerful and dangerous agencies usually employed, the absolute
control of them which they have, the trust necessarily reposed in them, the
compulsion which they might otherwise exercise, and the public nature of
their service render the rule, we think, just and reasonable.
It takes no argument to point out that bald assertions that ex-
emptions are void because they are against public policy or are
unfair and unreasonable can be readily dismissed from considera-
tion. Obviously, the question to get at is why exemptions are
21. 157 Ind. 305, at 309, 611 N. E. 678 (1901).
22. Doyle v. Fitchburg Rd., 166 Mass. 492, 44 N. E. 611 (1896).
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unreasonable and against public policy.23 The many ideas expressed
in the quoted paragraphs can in essence be reduced to two: (1)
though the passenger may not wish to take advantage of -the duty
required by law as to him, the state in its desire to preserve the
lives and safety of its citizens, cannot permit any condition which
might tend to result in the exercise of less care; (2) the shipper
or passenger himself may want to hold the company to its legally
required duty of care, and since the law gives him that right, the
law should prevent the carrier from using its superior bargaining
power to avoid its responsibility. Much is said, also, to the effect
that the carrier cannot be allowed to evade .the essential duties
which are the condition of its existence. As an independent rea-
son, unconnected with the two suggested, this one is not satisfying.
In view of the fact that there are many instances in which parties
may contract to do away with rights and duties secured by law in
absence of contract, the question naturally arises: What is there
in this situation which forbids such a contract? It is believed
that this third idea finds meaning only in connection with the first
thought expressed above.
Critique of the Rules:
(a) The State's Interest in the Safety of Its Citizens-In re-
spect to the first reason for forbidding exemptions from liability
for negligence, it may be said in the beginning that political theory
does not necessarily postulate that a state can forbid a citizen
from disposing of his life as he wishes. A distinction must be
drawn between the situation where a citizen is impelled by forces
beyond his control to order his life in a way he does not wish, and
the situation where he himself determines what to do with himself.
The former case, for example, would exist where a person is
forced to undertake a dangerous employment because the state
of the labor market is such that he must take any job he can get
in order to avoid the breadlines or starvation. In that situation.
a state founded on the idea of democracy should have the duty of
alleviating his lot to the greatest extent possible. But suppose,
for example, that an adventurous soul wishes to explore the clouds
in a rickety air crate of his own make and invention. Except for
the purpose of protecting unsuspecting and innocent persons on
the ground, need it be said that the state must act to save the
adventurer's own skin? Suicide is a crime only in a few states.
23. To make the problem simpler, I am assuming without discussion thatit is desirable to force common carriers to use the greatest practicable caution
in transporting passengers.
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Put this is not the place to go into the interesting questions sug-
gested by political philosophy. Suffice it to say that there is enough
doubt of the proposition that a person's life belongs not to himself
but to the state, to cast some doubt on the rest of the syllogism.
The purely theoretical difficulty just dismissed would probably
have little effect on courts or legislatures. But a practical ob-
jection seriously disturbs the whole proposition. One of its prem-
ises, we have seen, is that exemption from liability will reduce tho
care used by carriers. No longer being obliged to watch out for
the lives and safety of its passengers, a care once imposed because
of the existence of large contingent tort liability, nothing will force
carriers to preserve that degree of prudence essential to the public
welfare. Almost certainly, this deduction is purely a priori; the
courts never mention statistics when they make the statement, but
argue that the result, more accidents, must necessarily follow from
the cause, release from the duty of exercising care. But certainly
other factors may be operative which will preserve the desired
degree of caution. In the first place, common carriers have com-
petitors. Not only do railroad companies compete between them-
selves, but also against the merchant marine, trucking concerns,
private carriers and, now, airlines. A reputation for few mishaps,
high efficiency, careful service, is a valuable aid in the struggle.
Again, almost every accident of any serious nature results in de-
struction of or injury to the carrier's property. The consequent
loss of its own assets is an inducement to do all that is possible
to prevent such accidents. There are possibly other factors which
might be mentioned. But it must be concluded that in absence of
statistical proof that in states where exemptions are allowed there
are more accidents, directly traceable to that fact, than in states
where they are not allowed, or in absence of statistics showing a
higher accident rate among private carriers (which everywhere
are allowed to contract for exemptions) than among common car-
riers, the premise is not without demerits.
There is yet another reason for attacking the validity of the
objection that the interest of the state in the lives of its citizens
requires that nothing be done which might tend to endanger those
lives. If the statement were true, it must necessarily be true for
every case in which contract might endanger human life. Yet that
is not the holding where the carrier is private. Nor is it the rule,
in most states, in the cases of gratuitous passengers, express mes-
sengers, Pullman porters, news agents and circus employees. It is
true that many courts have rationalized these cases thus: that
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the carrier, by doing something it is not by law required to do-
that is, furnish free transportation, or tow circus trains or Pull-
man cars, or furnish facilities to express companies-steps out
of its character of a common carrier, and becomes for that pur-
pose a private carrier. True, this reasoning would distinguish the
passenger for consideration cases, but it does not answer the query:
If life must be protected at all costs, why must it not be protected
as well when the carrier is private as when it is public?
It might be interesting to note just how the courts have ra-
tionalized the cases in which they have allowed exemptions. In the
free pass cases, it is frequently argued that since a common car-
rier is under no duty to transport persons gratuitously, it can im-
pose its own terms for the favor. There can be no issue of in-
equality of bargaining power, for the prospective guest is not bar-
gaining, he is asking a favor. It is difficult to meet this proposition.
Certainly it is an appealing argument to maintain that a person
who accepts a gift should not protest or repudiate its conditions.
True as this may be, many courts reply that the question is not
one of morals but of the state's interest, as parens patriae, in the
lives of all of its citizens. If any court accepts this idea in any
type of case, it is certainly inconsistent on its part to discard it
merely because the passenger is carried free. Yet many are guilty
of the inconsistency. Some have answered by saying that rail-
roads do not carry so many free passengers that negligence is in-
creased. But such an answer only begs the question; it admits
that if many are carried, decreased care would result. There are
examples of accidents to large excursion groups carried free. And
further, there is no guaranty that equal diligence will be used in
looking after a free passenger as in guarding one for hire. As
a matter of fact, it is probably true that railroads are being as
careful as possible whoever the passenger, but on other grounds
than tort liability alone. Tort liability is not the only reason for
diligence and prudence, though no doubt it is an important factor.
Similar arguments are made in the express messenger, Pull-
man porter, circus employee, and news agent cases. It is first
pointed out that the relation of common carrier does not exist, for
various reasons. Thus, it is said that the employee is not a pas-
senger because he is not riding the trains to get from one place
to another, but he is merely working on moving premises. Or it
is argued that there is no duty on the railroad to deal with express
companies, or Pullman companies and the rest; the presence of
the duty to carry being essential to the status of a common carrier,
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its absence allows the carrier to contract as a private individual.
Or again, it is often said that there is no consideration to the rail-
road for carrying porters or express messengers or news agents;
the absence of consideration puts the employee in the position of a
gratuitous passenger, whose exemption contract will be enforced.
Here again, if the court accepts, in the passenger for hire cases,
the idea that a person cannot dispose of his own life because of
the interest of the state, it cannot be consistent in ignoring that
interest, no matter how the person is rightfully on the train.
There is a serious doubt, however, whether the employees,
whose plight we are considering, do travel gratuitously. Only one
court, New York, considers drovers gratuitous travellers. The
others find a consideration in the service performed, a service
otherwise devolving on the carrier, and on the rate paid for the
shipment. It seems difficult to distinguish the other cases. As
one court has quoted, "the voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are
hands of Esau. ' ' 24  There is no more duty to carry drovers than
there is to carry Pullman porters. The reasoning for the distinc-
tion is best summed up in the leading case, Baltimore & Ohio S.
TV. Ry. v. Voigt,25 an express messenger contract being the dis-
puted point. The basis of that decision was that railroads are
not common carriers of express comparnies,26 that, therefore, they
are free to contract with such companies and may impose such
terms as they desire. But it is submitted that the heart of the
problem is ignored by such reasoning. The question is not as be-
tween the carrier and the express company or the Pullman com-
pany, but as between the carrier and the employee. Now it cannot
be denied that though a carrier is.under a duty to haul livestock,
it is under no duty to carry drovers to care for the stock. Yet,
it is said, when the drover is carried he is travelling for a con-
sideration. Similarly, it would seem, the carrier is under no duty
to transport men to look after express matter or Pullman sleepers;
yet when it does carry them, they perform duties which the railroad
would otherwise have to do through its own servants. The duty
to perform those services arises out of the contract with the ex-
press or Pullman company. It may be argued that without the
contract there would be no obligation on the railroad to perform
those services, and that all the conditions of performance are
settled at once by the agreement; in other words, the contract does
not first create an obligation to perform services, which after-
24. Carter V. So. Riy., 100 S. C. 403, 84 S. E. 999 (1914).
25. 176 U. S. 498, 20 S. Ct. 385 (1900).
26. Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 6 S. Ct. 542 (1886).
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wards the railroad may surrender for consideration. But equally
well can it be said that other things being equal,.a railroad need
not hold itself out as a carrier of livestock or other classes of
freight. It may confine its business to the carriage of passengers.
Yet once the duty to perform is accepted, either by holding out or
by contract, when the burden is shifted to someone else in exchange
for transportation, the transportation is for consideration.
Furthermore, it is said in the drovers' cases, that the passage
fare is included in the fare paid for hauling the freight. It may
with equal reason be said that the price paid for the privilege of
sending express, or hauling Pullman cars, or having an exclusive
news agency, or shipping circuses includes fare for the individuals
as well as the chattels. That these individuals are carried by the
railroad as a private carrier may be true, but the point is this: the
drover also is in that position. The railroad is under no duty to
transport a drover as drover. Yet the courts are almost unanimous
in condemning exemptions in that case.
It' seems, then, that the first reason relied on by the courts is
not without fault. It is not entirely clear, theoretically, that the
state can validly interfere with a citizen's own desires as to his
safety. Nor is it entirely clear that the care exercised by the car-
rier will be decreased if its tort liability for injuries to its pas-
sengers is removed. Again, it is difficult to explain why the courts
feel more concerned for the safety of one class of passengers than
that of another. The reasons for the distinction are not convincing.
. (b) Unequal Bargaining Power-There remains to be con-
sidered the second reason advanced for refusing exemptions in the
case of passengers for hire, that is to say, to prevent railroad com-
panies from using their superior bargaining power to avoid their
legal responsibilities. It must be admitted that this is a more con-
vincing argument than the one just discussed, 'but it is open to one
objection. At the time it was first formulated, and for some time
afterward, railroad rates were not regulated by public bodies. It
was quite true, therefore, that carriers could charge what they
pleased and on what conditions they pleased, limited only by eco-
nomic laws of competition, monopoly price and the like. That
situation is now materially changed; rates are now under govern-
inent supervision, and the shipper need never fear being forced to
pay an exorbitant charge if he refuses to accept the risk of trans-
portation accidents. It is submitted that this fact almost completely
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undermines the reason so forcefully advanced in the Lockwood
case. Cessaute ratione legis, cessat lex.27
Limitation of Liability:
Up to this point, discussion has been directed towards the
reasons for refusing validity to exemptions from liability for neg-
ligence. But conceding that to allow complete exemption from lia-
bility for tort would tend to decrease care and increase accidents,
and conceding that even though rates are no longer solely within
the carriers' discretion, the railroads could still enforce harsh
bargains of exempted liability for lower fares, we are faced with
another alternative. Would it be possible to limit liability to some
reasonable figure, in return for some rate consideration or special
privilege?
One form of limitation may be dismissed with just a mention.
It is weil settled, even in jurisdictions that allow complete exemp-
tions from wilful and wanton wrongdoing. Those courts would
say also that gross negligence is excluded. Whatever the prac-
tical difference between these kinds of tort and ordinary negligence
may or may not be, the distinction exists in theory. 28
27. The "bargaining power" Idea suggests another digression into the
decisions allowing exemptions In the express messenger, Pullman porter, news
agent and circus employee cases. I have discussed previously the theory that
exemptions in these cases are valid because the railroad acts as a private
carrier. Another reason advanced In those decisions starts from the proposition
that where bargaining power is unequal, it is unreasonable to allow the stronger
party to exempt Itself from its legal responsibilities. But In these situations,
it Is argued, bargaining power Is equal. The express companies and the Pullman
Company are large corporations, fully capable of caring for their own interests
in negotiating with the railroads. To a lesser degree Is this true of circus com-
panies and news agencies, but even these are on stronger ground than the ordi-
nary shipper. Out of their negotiations, therefore, will no doubt emerge agree-
ments fair to both sides. The worker, voluntarily entering his employment, under
no compulsion to choose the particular job, accepts these fair agreements with
eyes open, as a man of common sense and experience. The most surprising
thing about such obtuse reasoning is the fact of Its almost blind acceptance
even In recent years. No doubt, the first premise is true; the railroad and the
employer are bargaining on equal terms. But our Interest,, for the present,
is with the person who Is to be carried in this dangerous instrumentality upon
whose owners the law Imposes the greatest measure of care, a standard owing
equally to everyone rightfully aboard. It Is a matter of common knowledge
that economic theorists of the last century continually propounded the untruth
that one worker can and should bargain singly with one employer. That is the
basis of the reasoning of the Voight case, and that is Its fault. The worker
is In just as weak a position to bargain as is the shipper, and In the absence
of collective action has had usually to accept without objection such terms of
employment as were offered him. If unequal bargaining power drives the courts
to protect the shipper against undesired exemptions, so also should it have led
them to protect the employee.
28. Another type of partial exemption, earliest expressed in the New
York cases, may be mentioned. It is that, except In the case of passengers
for hire, a person can exempt himself from the malicious wrong or gross
negligence of his servants. Only two other Jurisdictions have favored that rule,
Connecticut (Griswold v. N. Y. d. N. E. Rd.. 53 Conn. 371, 4 A. 261 (1885)),
and New Jersey (Kinney v. Central Rd. of N. J., 32 N. J. L. 407 (1868)), on
the grounds that the doctrine of respondeat superior Is not based on natural
Justice, but is merely a legal fiction, which should, therefore, be open to
rejection by freely contracting parties, and that a master could not be morally
culpable for the morally culpable acts of his servants. The doctrine has been
repudiated (Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, cit. note 9 ; Illinois Central Rd. v. Read,
37 II1. 485 (1865) ; Gulf, C. A S. F. Ry. v. McGown, 65 Tex. 640 (1886) on the
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The type of limitation in which a specific sum is named be-
forehand as the maximum recovery to be allowed deserves more
careful study. But two railroad cases directly on point could be
found, and neither was well considered. In one, a drover's pass
limiting liability to one thousand dollars was involved, and in the
other there was a free pass with the same sum as the maximum.
In both cases, the contracts were held void, in one because of
statute,2 9 in the other because of previous decisions, which, how-
ever, were all exemption cases.30 Dicta in one other case are
similarly opposed to the practice.3 1 In favor of allowing limita-
tion can be found only some vague language in a Montatia case,32
and the holding of a New York case that if consideration, in the
form of reduced fare, is given, exemptions will be allowed.
3 3
In states which allow exemptions, it is almost certain that, a
fortiori, limitations would also be allowed. And it is also quite
certain that where exemptions are not allowed, limitations will
not be. And yet if the reasons for refusing validity for exemp-
tions are considered, it is quite possible to remove limitations from
their scope, so long as the amount named is a reasonably large
sum. If the maximum is a sizeable figure, the financial induce-
ment for exercising care, so strongly relied on by the courts, is
still present. Thus the sum found in the cases mentioned above,
one thousand dollars, is comparatively small, and it is conceivable
that the carrier would rather gamble against contingent tort lia-
bility than install expensive safety devices. But a figure of ten or
fifteen thousand dollars, in addition to the possibility that one acci-
dent may produce many fatalities, would probably induce a great
measure of caution indeed. Secondly, it would seem that if a
maximum rate with unlimited liability, approved by the state com-
mission, were accompanied by an offer of a reduced rate with
limited liability, there would be little to object to as far as "bar-
gaining power" is concerned. The customer would be forced into
nothing, but would be given a clear choice between two reasonable
opportunities.
III. THE RULE AND AERONAUTICAL LAW.
Despite easily raised objections, the rule forbidding a com-
ground that a corporation can act only through its agents, and that, therefore,
if exemptions are allowed, the corporation would escape any responsibility.
29. Chicago, R. I. & P. ly. v. Posten, 59 Kan. 449, 53 P. 465 (1898)
see Appendix.
30. Ventz v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 259 Mo. 450, 168 S. W. 1166 (1914).
31. Feldschnieder v. Chicago, M. & St. P., 122 Wis. 423, 99 N. W. 1034
(1904).
32. Mily v. No. Pac. Ry., 41 Mont. 51. 108 P. 5 (1910); see Appendix.
33. Anderson v. Erie Rd., 223 N. Y. 277, 119 N. E. 557 (1918).
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mon carrier to enter into contracts exempting itself from liability
for negligence to its passengers is strongly entrenched in this
country. And, if recent cases are accurate prophets, the rule will
be applied -to air transport companies. They are common carriers;
the rule developed for one type of common carrier should apply
to all, runs the argument.3 4 But the matter is not so simple. The
rule is not based on entirely firm ground, and there are reasons
for urging that it be not extended to the field of air law.
Motive for Reducing Airline Tort Liability:
The most compelling motive for urging the abandonment of
the rule is an economic one. Aviation corporations are not in a
strong financial position. They probably could not exist and de-
velop as they should without government subsidies of some sort:
direct grants in Europe, mail revenues in this country. Capital is
not quickly drawn into the field because of the large risk involved.
One of the most uncertain of these risks is tort liability. One
accident might easily give rise to damages running into six figures,
not only because of the number of people killed or injured, but
also because of large jury verdicts. The res ipsa loquitur formula,
and the difficulty of proving just how an accident did happen may
often result in large verdicts where no actionable negligence ex-
ists.5 5  And not only are people injured, but relatively fragile
planes may be utterly demolished in almost unpreventible accidents.
Again, the industry is yet just beginning to grow, and has not,
therefore, the resources which create stability. Invention and im-
provement make obsolescence and amortization rapid, and the ex-
pense of continual rebuilding and improvement must be enormous.
Operation costs are high: the best materials must be used, the
personnel must be highly trained and command, as a consequence,
high wages. An important item is the fact that payloads are com-
paratively small. While one engine can. haul a large number of
cars, one plane can carry only a certain quantity of freight or
number of people; any excess must be sent by another plane, at the
same cost as the first.8 6 It can be seen that it is of vital importance
to the industry to reduce these costs if possible. If some method,
both fair to the public and beneficial to the air carrier, for re-
34. Curtiss-Wright Fting Service v. Glose, 66 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A.-3,
1933), note, 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 154; Harriman, "Carriage of Passengers,"
1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 33, at 46 (1930).
35. See O'Ryan, "Limitations of Aircraft Liability," 3 Air Law Rev. 27
(1932).
36. Most of these statements will be found set out In an elaborate way in
Kaftal, "Liability and Insurance," 5 Air Law Rev. 157, at 275 (1934).
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ducing tort liability can be found, the law should encourage that
solution.
Exemption or Limitation:
It would seem that total exemption from liability is not that
solution. It is not fair to the passenger to -ask him to bear the
total burden which, if fault lies in some measure at the basis of
tort responsibility, properly belongs to another.. However bene-
ficial financially it may be to the carrier to escape the cost of in-
juries, we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual harmed
may be equally or even more unable to bear the loss than the
company. Again, the overwhelming tradition of American law
opposes such exemptions. It would be extremely difficult to induce
courts or legislatures to adopt it.
Limitation, rather than complete exemption, seems to be the
ideal solution.3 7  More persuasive arguments for it could be made
to the courts, probably, than for exemption. Consider, for ex-
ample, the theory which is one of the two bases for the rule against
exemptions, that the interest of the state in the citizens' lives pre-
cludes the allowance of any factor to exist that might result in
decreased care. It has already been pointed out that even as to
complete exemptions the argument is not thoroughly convincing,
and that it is less so in the case of limitation of liability. Finan-
cial responsibility of a substantial degree would probably provide
just as complete a motive of self-interest as unlimited responsi-
bility. It may be pointed out here that there is yet another reason
for doubting the validity of the safety theory. It has always been
held that common carriers can insure themselves, and thus relieve
themselves from liability." The courts, in these cases, have rec-
ognized other motives that induce care. For example, the desire
to reduce premium expense causes the company to carry less in-
surance and *increase its vigilance. And" the better record the
carrier has for skill and prudence, the less will be its premium
rates. In view of these cases, it could not be argued that the ex-
istence of limited liability would allow air transport companies
to insure and tend to reduce the prudent conduct of their business.
37. Excluding insurance from consideration; see note 1. It has been sug-
gested that limitation of liability alone would not be enough, because the cumu-
lative liability from one accident might be large enough to embarrass the com-
pany materially; Kaftal, op. cit. note 37. He suggests compulsory insurance
up to a certain limit, with a total exemption to the carrier. But if the carrier
is allowed to set a maximum liability, it can easily insure for that amount,
and thus obtain the same result. O'Byan, op. cit. note 36, makes the same
suggestion as Kaftal.
38. Amer. Casualty Insur. Co.'s Case, 82 Md. 535 (1896).
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Not only would financial responsibility produce such vigilance
in the case of air carriers, but other factors exist that tend strongly
to the same end. It has already been pointed out that they are
present in the case of railroads. The drive of competition, the
desire for business success, and the necessity of preserving ex.
pensive machinery are sufficient incentive for the corporation's di-
rectors to take precautions, and the lower rank servants of the
corporation are urged to caution by their need of remaining em-
ployed, by fear for their own skins, and even by common hu-
manity. 9 Even more are these considerations applicable to air
carriers. Public confidence in the safety of air travel is small
now; accidents diminish it still more. One accident can probably
nullify large and expensive advertising campaigns. To increase
their volume of business, air carriers must increase their safety.
Again, aircraft and their equipment are not only expensive, but
also are relatively fragile. Little can be salvaged after a serious
accident. Comparatively speaking, these companies are not finan-
cially strong, as it is, and they must take every precaution to pre-
serve the physical assets in which they have invested. 0 Finally,
the self-interest of the pilots, mechanics and the like must be very
great. Not only their positions but their very lives are threatened
to a greater extent than those of railroad employees. These fac-
tors, together with the financial burden of even limited liability
should allay all fears of the possibility that care will decrease with
decreased tort responsibility.
In this connection, another reason for distinguishing air car-
riers from other kinds of common carriers becomes apparent and
significant. The physical distinction between them itself raises a
problem in the case of the former not present in the others. The
fact that what goes up must come down creates an extra hazard
in the air carrier industry. To this it might be said, "Even more
reason for requiring greater care by every possible means." But
the fact is overlooked that there always remains, at least at the
present time, a possibility of something going wrong, something
that even an extremely cautious mechanic could not discover or
forestall. To other types of transport devices, such small troubles
present no problem. They can limp along to the next station, or
even stop where they are for repairs. But in the case of airplanes,
this is usually impossible. The craft must land at once, with the
dangerous possibility of crashing. It may be said that where all
39. Muldoon v. Seattle City Ry., 7 Wash. 528, 35 P. 422 (1893).
40. See Allen, "Limitations of Liability to Passengers by Air Carriers,"
1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 325 (1930).
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possible care is used, there would be no tort liability anyway. But
the instructions which tell the jury that the greatest possible cau-
tion must be used, the application of the res ipsa loquitur formula,
and the technical ignorance of juries and courts may often result
in verdicts even in the cases where the carrier could do nothing
more to protect its passengers. Finally, the as yet irreducible
minimum of risk is well recognized by passengers, and if they
voluntarily travel by air because of its comfort, speed or novelty,
they should be willing to take part of the financial risk of accident.
To promote air commerce, the law should recognize its problems,
and cast its rules accordingly.
Nor does the "unequal bargaining power" idea necessarily
militate against the adoption of limited liability into aeronautical
law. It is true that air transport companies are not yet subject
to government rate regulation. But even so, the rationalization
adduced in the Lockwood case is hardly applicable to these com-
panies today, if for no other, at least for one compelling reason-
the presence of competition. Air carriers cannot dominate trans-
portation, as could the railroads in the last century and the early
part of this one. Trucks, ships, and railroads compete with air-
craft, and rates must be fixed, to some extent, accordingly. The
only case in which the compulsion, feared by the courts, can be
exercised, is the situation where speed is essential. But mere speed
is probably not the only reason for travelling by air, and if it is a
reason it must be paid for, under our economic system. Rates,
however, are no doubt fixed with other factors also in view, and,
being common carriers, the company could not raise its fare in the
particular instance when it knew that the particular passenger
was in special need of rapid transportation. Accepting for the
moment, however, the argument that by its control of speedy car-
riage the company had superior bargaining power, we are not faced
with an impasse in attempting to limit liability. It is still possible
to give the passenger an option between unlimited liability at a
fixed, non-exorbitant rate, and limited liability at a lower fare.
And if neither choice suits him, he can travel more cheaply by
other means of transportation.
Is Liability Limitation Possible?
(1) By Contract-
(a) The Cases-If limited liability, then, is a reasonable
method of cutting down the expense of accidents, fair to the pas-
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senger and beneficial to the carrier, the problem of adoption re-
mains. How can such limitation be made legal? The method
now being tried is that of private contract. Since such contracts
will be tested in the courts, the emphasis, in analyzing the method,
must be placed on the question: what attitude will the courts take
to such contracts? No wild guess is necessary; there are already
cases on point.41  Several types of contract are in u'se, and four
typical ones have already been held invalid. One of these con-
tained an absolute exemption clause ;42 another attempted to limit
liability to $10,000. 4 3 The objection to both was that a common
carrier cannot compel a passenger to release liability for.negli-
gence. This same objection proved fatal to a contract which set
out three fares, each fare carrying with it a certain maximum lia-
bility; since no choice of unlimited liability was allowed, the con-
tract was held void." It must be noted that the case so holding
was in New York, where exemptions for reduced fare are al-
lowed.4 5 In that state, therefore, the following ticket would probably
be good: "This is a Class A ticket. The fare under a Class A ticket
is lower than under a Class B ticket. In consideration of said
reduced fare, the passenger agrees that the Company shall in no
event be liable to said passenger, his heirs or representatives, for
injury or damage to said passenger in an excess of $25,000." r
A possible objection to its efficacy is that it does not, in so many
words, include negligence as a type of harm for which liability
is limited. Some courts would construe the language that strictly4"
Another type of ticket, not expressly exempting from or limiting
liability, is designed to reduce the measure of care ordinarily im-
posed on a common carrier. It provides that the company is not
a common carrier, but is liable merely for negligence, and that
the mere occurrence of an accident shall not be considered evi-
41. Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport 1931 U. S. Av. R. 205 (D. C.,
Pa.) ; Curtiss-Wright Flying Service v. Glose cft note 34; Allison v. Standard
Air Lines, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 292, aff'd 65 iF. (2d) 668 (C. C. A.-9, 1935);
Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 266 N. Y. 244 (1935), note, 6
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 321 (1930).
42. "The user of this ticket agrees that the company, in the performance
of the transportation covered by his ticket, Is not a common carrier for hire,
and/or liable as such, but is a private carrier; and that the company shall not
be liable for injury or death to the person . . . caused In any manner whatso-
ever, whether attributable to negligence or not, occurring during, and/or arising
out of the performance, or failure of performance of the transportation for
which this ticket is issued.... ;".refused effect in Law v. Transcontinental
Air Transport, cit. note 41.
. 43. ". . . in the event of the injury or death of the holder due to any
cause for which the Company is legally liable, the Company's liability is
limited to $10,000 ;" invalidated in the Glose case, cit. note 34.
44. Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways cit note 41. The contract Is
set out in full in the note in 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW at page 284.
45. Anderson v. Brie Rd., cit. note 33.
46. Edmunds, op. cit. note 41. He thought also that this ticket would
be good in New York.
47. See note 12.
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dence of negligence. This attempt to contract away a legal status
was early nullified.4 8  That holding throws some doubt on the
practical value of a provision in the proposed uniform air pas-
senger ticket: ". . . if I am accepted as a passenger, I volun-
tarily assume the ordinary risks of air transportation and stipulate
that the company or companies represented herein shall not be
responsible save for its or their own neglect of duty. . . -49 This
provision has correctly been criticized; since a common carrier
must exercise the highest possible care, there seem to be no "or-
dinary risks" which a passenger can assume.50 The company would
not be liable in any event for extraordinary risks.
It is apparent that all the contracts of any practical effect
have already been held bad, but one, and that one would be con-
sidered valid probably only in one state, if at all. In other words,
the tradition and authority of the railroad cases are too strong to
be overcome in the courts. Whatever faults may be pointed out
in their reasoning, the decisions are too well fixed, the rules are
too well settled to be revised to any extent now. And there is no
indication that different rules will be fixed for the air cases. There
are other disadvantages in trying to work piecemeal through the
courts. One of these is the confusion that arises out of conflict
of laws problems. A good deal of air transportation is interstate,
.and in the absence of federal law, state rules control. Different
states may probably have different rules, and since the extent of
liability will be determined by the fortuitous circumstance of the
geographical location of the accident, it will be practically as diffi-
cult to provide beforehand for meeting that liability as it is now.
(b) Conflict of Laws-In general, the courts have developed
three rules for determining the validity of contracts in the conflict
of laws: place of making, place of performance, and place con-
templated by the parties. But the particular situation here is even
more complicated by the fact that tort, as well as contract, is in-
volved. The usual rule is that the place of injury determines what
tort law applies. To these possibilities may be added a fifth: if
the law sought to be applied is contrary to the public policy of the
forum, it will not be enforced. The interaction of these various
methods of settling the problem causes great confusion. 1
48. Allison v. Standard Air Lines, cit. note 41.
49. See 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 228 (1930).
50. Edmunds, op. cit. note 41; Logan, Wikoff, 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
515-516 (1930).
51. There would seem to be, no logical necessity for choosing one rule
rather than another. One school, however, has argued that only the state
where the contract is made can give it validity; If that state refuses, no other
jurisdiction can give the contract legal effect, and if its laws support the
agreement, it should be valid everywhere, Beale, "What Law Governs Validity
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The easiest case is that in which the contract is made in one
state, to be completely performed there, and the accident happens
there. Suit is then brought in some other state. All of the various
formulas are satisfied by the former jurisdiction: place of mak-
ing of the contract, place of performance, probably the place in-
tended by the parties, place of injury. The courts have found no
difficulty in applying the law of that jurisdiction.52  The case
should likewise be easy in which, although the contract is made
in one state, both complete performance and the injury occur else-
where, in other words, where the place of making the contract is
disassociated entirely from its performance. It may be difficult in
such a case to determine which law should govern as between
that of the start or completion of performance or that of injury,
but it would seem that the purely fortuitous circumstance that the
ticket was bought in a certain place should not be considered. Yet
the majority of the court, in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Corcoran,13 held that federal law governed a contract of carriage
from Canada to England, the ticket having been bought in Boston.
The court relied on the territorial theory of conflict of laws:
since the contract where made was void, it must necessarily be
void at all places and for all purposes. It also relied on the Ken-
sington,54 a Supreme Court case, in which in respect to a ticket
issued in Belgium for transportation to this country, it was held
that Belgian law would not be applied because of the public policy
of the United States against exemptions. 5 But in that case, per-
formance was to be partly in the United States, and the court
probably had reference to that fact.
More difficult cases are those in which part of the perform-
ance is to take place in the state where the contract is made. When
the injury also occurs in the state of contracting, the court has
of a Contract," 23 Harv. Law Rev. at 260 (1910). But it has been pointed out
that "A sovereign state has in the very nature of things the power to attach
any legal consequences whatever to any state of facts whatever, Including acts
in other countries, even by persons not citizens or residents of the former."
Lorenzen, "Validity and Effect of Contracts in Conflict of Laws," 30 Yale Law
Jour. 655 (1921) ; Cook, "Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,"
3 Yale Law Jour. 457 (1924).
52. Shelton v. Canadian No. Ry. Go., 189 Fed. 153 (C. C. Minn., 1911)
Kno wlton v. Erie Rd., 19 Ohio St. 260 (1869) ; Forepaugh v. Del. etc. Rd., 128
Pa. St. 217 (1889-Injury to goods; held: no public policy prevents enforce-
ment of New York law, though Pennsylvania rule Is contra; that law, in this
case, does not directly affect the state or its citizens, nor is it contrary tojustice and morality).
53. 9 F. (2d) 724 (C. C. A.-2, 1925) ; Maucher v; Chicago, R. 1. & 11. Ry.,
100 Neb. 237, 159 N. V. 422 (1916-contract made in Illinois, but there is no
showing that It was to be even partly performed there. Injury In Nebraska.
Held: Nebraska law governs; against public policy to enforce Illinois rule).
54. 183 U. S. 263, 22 S. Ct. 102 (1902-carriage of goods).
55. Cf. O'Regan v. Cunard Steamship Co., 160 Mass. 356, 35 N. E. 1070(1894-contract made in Ireland for passage to Boston; injury on high seas;
suit In Massachusetts. Held: though the exemption would be void under
Massachusetts law, no public policy forbids application of English law here).
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little difficulty in applying the law of that state.5 6 Supposing the
contract to have been made in State A, the injury to hiave occurred
in State B, and the suit to have been brought in State A, the latter
jurisdiction, again, will probably apply its own law, though it could
easily use that of State B, conforming to the rule as to torts.5 7
But the case is more difficult where, in the same situation, suit is
brought in State B rather than State A. In some of the decisions,
the law of the forum was applied, 8 but on different theories:
one court looked to the tort rule of place of injury; another looked
to the contract rule of place of making, but thought that public
policy precluded that state's law from being applied; another
looked to the "intention" of the parties, presuming that the con-
tract was intended to have effect rather than be void; a fourth
relied on the place of performance formula. Other courts have
applied the law of State A.5 9  Finally, assuming the same fact
situation, suit may be brought in State C. At least one possibility
should be easy to eliminate in a case of that nature: the internal
law of the forum should not be involved. Yet the problem of
choosing'between States A and B has divided the courts.60  These
cases well show the confusion that varying state rules, both as to
conflict of laws and as to internal law, result in, a confusion and
uncertainty that would remain if limitation of aircraft liability
by private contract is attempted.""
As a final objection to attaining limited liability through pri-
vate contract and court action, there should be mentioned a psy-
chological factar. Air transport companies have trouble enough
in persuading the public that air travel is safe. They could hardly-
emphasize that fact in advertising and then ask the passenger to
bear part of the financial risk of his trip. It might make him re-
56. O'Brien v. Chicago & N. W. By., 116 Fed. 502 (C. C. Iowa, 1902).
57. Mexican Natl. R. Co. v. Jackson, 118 Fed. 549 (C. C. A.-5, 1902)
Davis v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 93 Wis. 470, 67 N. W. 16 (1896).
58. Smith v. Atchison, T. & S. F. By., 194 Fed. 79 (C. C. A.-8, 1912-tort
rule applies, the contract being "tled to" the tort) ; Lake Shore & Mich. So. By.
v. Teeters, 166 Ind. 335, 77 N. E. 299 (1906-contract rule governs, but public
policy controls); Atchison, T. & S. F. By. v. Smith, 38 Okla. 157, 132 P. 494(1913-intention of parties formula) ; Burnett v. Pa. Rd., 176 Pa. St. 45, 34 A.
972 (1896-place of performance rule; but note that the contract was for
transportation from New Jersey to New York, through Pennsylvania; the latter
state, however, was said to be the "place of performance").
59. Meuer v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Rd., 5 S. D. 568, 59 N. W. 945 (1894-
Wisconsin law governed, but not being proved, law of forum was applied) ;
Illinois Central v. Beebe, 174 Ill. 13, 50 N. E. 1019 (1898) ; Fish v. Delaware,
L. & W. Rd., 211 N. Y.,374, 105 N. E. 661 (1914).
60. Weir v. Rountree, 173 Fed. 776 (C. C. A.-8, 1909-State B; not
necessary to determine validity of the contract because this was a suit under a
death by wrongful act statute) ; Wiley v. Grand Trunk By. of Canada, 227 Fed.
127 (D. C. N. Y., 1915-urisdiction A; law of place of making) ; O'Regan v.
Cunard Steamship Co., cit. note 55.
61. See excellent comment, 35 Yale Law Jour. 997 (1926).
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pent of his hardiness. At least, that seems to be the attitude
of many of those connected with the industry.
62
(2) Legislation-It would seem, therefore, that because the
common law rule is so well established that it will be very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to get the courts to apply different rules
to air carriers, because of the uncertainty arising from varying
state rules and the conflict of laws, and finally because of the psy-
chological disadvantage of arranging for limited liability by indi-
vidual stipulation, the method of contract and court-made rule is
not the best means of reaching the desired end. The only other is
legislation, both by the federal government and by uniform state
action. The process may take time, but so also would the piece-
meal method of judicial legislation. It would probably be easier
to induce legislatures in the various jurisdictions to act than courts,
especially now when uniform state aviation laws are being adopted.
The resulting desirable uniformity is obvious. And finally, the
psychological factor would be absent, since the passenger's atten-
tion would not have to be directed to the dangers of flight in the
graphic way in which it is when he is asked to relieve the carrier
from part of its liability. Precedent is not lacking for such an
act. The Marine Limitation of Liability Act,6 3 passed by Congress
in 1851, was the result of one of the very factors discussed here
as to air carriers, that is to say, the weak financial position of the
industry and the need of attracting capital to it. That Act pro-
vides that the liability of the owner of a vessel be limited, in cer-
tain instances, to the amount or value of the interest of the owner
in the vessel. This would hardly be fair in the case of aircraft,
because the value of one plane would not be sufficient to give
the passenger much of a recovery. Even under the Marine Act,
be it noted, if the ship is totally lost, the owner is not liable at all. 4
A fortiori, an act which merely seeks to limit liability to a named
amount should not be objected to by the Federal Congress. The
consideration that in their early history, railroads were aided by
huge and valuable land grants should also not be lost sight of.
Finally, the government has expressed itself in favor of limited
liability by its adherence to the Warsaw Convention.
Constitutional provisions in five states will prevent any such
law from being passed. A typical article reads: "No law shall
be enacted in this state limiting the amount of damages to be re-
62. See Report of the Proceedings at the National Legislative Air Con-
ference, 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW at 536 (1930).
63. See Appendix.
64. Craig v. Continental Insur. Co., 141 U. S. 638, 12 S. Ct. 97 (1891).
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covered for causing the death or injury of any person.' '65  In
four more, no statute limiting liability for death can be passed,
but their constitutions say nothing of limitation of liability for
injuries not resulting in death.6  The constitution of one state
provides that corporations! engaged in transportation for hire are
common carriers, and are liable as such, and that they shall not
make any contracts relieving themselves from any of that liability
as to passengers. 67  It is an open question whether this provision
would be construed to' prevent legislation limiting liability. Nine
states have statutes forbidding common carriers to exempt them-
selves from liability."" It may be difficult to get their legislatures
to pass a statute allowing limitation to a maximum sum. Four
states have similar statutes, which, however, are limited to gross
negligence, fraud, or wilful wrong. 9 Nineteen states have adopted
that section of the Uniform State Aeronautical Act which reads:
"The liability of the operator of an aircraft carrying passengers,
for injury to or death of such passengers, shall -be determined by
the rules of law applicable to torts on land arising out of similar
relationships."76  Pennsylvania has a statute to the same effect. It
is doubtful that the public policy declared by this provision would
present much more of an obstacle to the passage of the proposed
act than the common law rules as to railroad transportation now in
force in these states. On the other hand, some states have already
begun to legislate in respect to limitation of liability of aircraft
owners. Thus California has a statute doing away with liability
for injury to gratuitous passengers except for intoxication or wil-
ful wrong. Maryland has a statute very similar to the Federal
Marine Act discussed above, limiting liability of the owner of air-
craft in interstate commerce to the amount of his interest in the
value of the plane and its freight. Four states limit liability to .a
specified sum, 71 and only two provide for unlimited liability for
negligence expressly in the case of aircraft.72  Finally, it should
be noted that fifteen states have set a maximum limit of recovery
65. Arizona, Art. II, §31; Arkansas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania and Wyoming.
66. New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah.
67. South Carolina.
68. Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky (constitution), Massachusetts (an ambiguous
statute, referred to "passengers whom it [the carrier] suffers to enter or leave
by, a door or its car or train, to do so at their own risk), Missouri, North
Dakota, Texas (referring to injuries resulting in death), Virginia and Wisconsin.
69. California, Montana, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.
70. Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. It
will be noted that seven of these states have appeared in the lists previously
set out In notes.
71. Colorado ($3000-$5000), Massachusetts ($500-$5000), Missouri ($2000-
$10,000), New Mexico ($7500). All of these are death acts.
72. Arizona and Connecticut.
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in their death by wrongful act statutes.73 In those states, how-
ever, a statute is still desirable to cover the case of injury not
resulting in death. With the precedent of the limitation in the
death acts, it should not be difficult to urge the adoption of the
same thing in an injury by aircraft statute. 4 If allowances are
made for duplications in the lists just given, it is apparent that
no grave statutory or constitutional provisions stand in the way
of the statute being proposed in most of the states. There is no
tradition in federal legislation against it; in fact, the Marine
Limitation of Liability Act and the Warsaw Convention are pre-
cedents in its favor. A federal act would cover most commercial
flying, and the small number of states which could not or would
not pass the statute would not materially affect the situation.7"
There would be little doubt of the constitutionality of such a
statute, especially if it is limited to prospective accidents, as far
as due process of law is concerned. The Supreme Court of the
United States has said:
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common
law. That is only one of the forms of municipal law, and is no more sacred
than any other. Rights of property which have been created by the common
law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule
of conduct, may be changed at the will . . . of the legislature, unless pre-
vented by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of statutes is
to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt it
to the changes of time and circumstances. 76
Following this reasoning, workmen's' compensation7 7  and em-
ployers' liability acts 78 have been held valid. And in answer to
the attempted distinction that those statutes augment, and do not
diminish liability, the Supreme Court held that the distinction was
one without a difference.
79
73. $12,500-Wisconsin; $10,000-Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Missouri, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia;
$500-$10,000-Massachusetts; $7500-Minnesota; $7000-New Hampshire; $5000
-Colorado and ,Maine.
74. Several of the states having limitations on recovery for death are
among those listed in previous notes. Thus Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Virginia and Wisconsin are found listed In note 68, South Dakota in note 69,
Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, South Dakota and Wisconsin in note 70, and
Connecticut in note 72.
75. In at least one of them, New York, a properly worded contract will
accomplish the same end, as was pointed out above.
76. Second Employers' Lability Cases, 223.U. S. 50, 32 S. Ct. 169 (1912).
77. New York Central v. White, 243 U. S. 188. 37 S. Ct. 247 (1916-no
objection that amount recoverable may be curtailed; "no person has a vested
interest in any rule of law . . .") ; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243
U. S. 219. 37 S. Ct. 260 (1917-not a deprivation of trial by jury).
78. Supra note 76.
79. Martin v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Rd., 203 U. S. 284, 27 S. Ct. 100
(1906). There is an old Pennsylvania case in which a statute limiting liability
of railroads to passengers to $3000 was held void: Thirteenth & Fifteenth St.
Ry. v. Boudrou, 92 Pa. St. 475 (1880). The decision seemed to rely on consti-
tutional provisions that for every injury to the person, he shall have a remedy;
the court apparently construed "remedy" to mean the full amount of the
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IV. CONCLUSION.
In determining whether to limit the liability of air carriers,
two interests must be balanced. On the one hand is that of the
individual carried, that he remain unharmed by the negligence of
the carrier, and that reparation in damages be made for any harm
caused by such negligence. On the other hand is the social interest
in the development of transportation by air. Sacrifice on both sides
should be made, and if a method can be found by which sacrifice
will not be too great, so much the better. It is believed that limi-
tation of liability admirably fits the situation. A substantial sum
will fairly compensate the passenger for his injury or his family
for his death. At the same time, the fact that liability cannot
exceed a maximum not only will reduce high contingent financial
loss, but will allow insurance to be carried at reasonable rates.
This also will react to the benefit of the passenger in the form of
more certain recovery at smaller cost. The following statute is
suggested:
In any action hereafter brought to recover damages for the injury or
death of any passenger of a common carrier by air [in interstate or foreign
commerce], caused by the negligence of such common carrier or its servants,
the damages shall not exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars.8 0
Appendix
Key: A. Rules, by States, as to Exemption from and Limitation
of Liability for Negligence in Railroad and Marine cases.
B. Law Relating to Exemption from and Limitation of Lia-
bility of Aircraft Owners and Operators.
C. Death by Wrongful Act Statutes.
1. Constitutional Provisions.
2. Citation to Statute.
3. Elements To Be Considered in Measuring Damages.
4. Limitation On Amount Recoverable.
5. Miscellaneous Statutes.1
pecuniary damage sustained. Two judges dissented. A case in the lower
courts on which the court relied had held the statute invalid on the same
ground, but had also pointed out that an express constitutional provision
prohibited it: Central Rd. of N., J. v. Cook, 1 W. N. C. 319. See Barnett,
"Statutory Limitation of Tort Liability," 12 Ore. Law Rev. 109 (1923).
80. The bracketed words are, of course, for the Federal statute. Ten
thousand dollars has been suggested merely because it is the sum found in most
death by wrongful act statutes. The air lines themselves have gone as high as
$25,000: see Allen, op. cit. note 40.
1. Cross-references between divisions A, B, and C have been omitted. To
obtain an accurate picture of the law of any particular state, therefore each
division should be examined. Thus, if the Death Act has a limitation on the
amount recoverable, that fact would bear on the liability of aircraft owners.
Similarly, a constitutional provision prohibiting any law limiting the liability of
common carriers would be applicable to air transport companies.
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ALABAMA
C. 1. None.
2. Alabama Code (Michie, 1928), §§5695, 5696.
3. ". . . such damages as the jury may assess."
ARIZONA
B. Revised Code of Arizona (Struckmeyer, 1928, Supp.), §§175z32, 175z33:
Provides that pilots and their employers be responsible for damage
to persons caused by negligent operation of aircraft by such pilots;
and that the liability of the owner of one aircraft to the owner of
another aircraft, or to aeronauts or passengers on either aircraft,
for damages caused by'collision on land or in the air, shall be
determined by the rules of law applicable to torts on land.
C. 1. Article II, § 31: "No law shall be enacted in this state limiting
the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the death or
injury of any person."
2. Revised Code of Ariz. (Struckmeyer, 1928), §§944, 946.
3. ". . . the jury shall give such damages as they deem fair and just."
ARKANSAS
A. Constitution of Arkansas, Art. XVII, §12: "All railroads which are
now or may be hereafter built and operated, either in whole or in
part, in this State shall be responsible for all damages to persons
and property, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the
General Assembly."
Digest of Statutes (Crawford and Moses, 1921), §8562: Pursuant to
Art. XVII, §12 of the Constitution, provides that railroads be
liable for all damages to persons or property.
St. Louis, I. M. & St. Ry. Co. v. Pitcock, 82 Ark. 441, 101 S. W. 725
(1907) ; no exemption allowed either as to pay or free passengers.
C. 1. Article V, §32: "No act of the General Assembly shall limit the
amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for
injuries to persons or property."
2. Digest of Statutes (Crawford & Moses, 1921), §§1074, 1075.
3. Fair and just compensation, with reference to the pecuniary in-
juries resulting to the wife and next of kin.
CALIFORNIA
A. Civil Code (Deering, 1931), §2174: The obligations of a common
carrier cannot be limited by general notice on its part, but may be
by special contract. ["Common carrier" includes carrier of per-
sons: §2168.]
Same, §2175: "A common carrier cannot be exonerated, by any agree-
ment made in anticipation thereof, from liability for the gross
negligence, fraud or willful wrong of himself or his servants."
Wi/alther v. Southern, Pacific Rd. Co., 159 Cal. 769, 116 P. 51 (1911):
Secs. 2174 and 2175 (supra) apply to free as well as pay passengers;
exemption from liability for negligence allowed, but not for wanton,
willful or gross negligence.
B. California Statutes (1933), Ch. 438, p. 1135: Provides that no free
guest of or joint adventurer with an airman, "nor shall any other
person have" a right of action for damages for injury or death
during flight, unless the accident resulted from the intoxication or
wilful wrong of the pilot. [The quoted words probably refer only
to the death by wrongful act beneficiaries of the deceased person.]
Civil Code .(Deering, 1931), §1714Y4 : Provides that owners of "motor
vehicles" be responsible for injury or death of persons caused by
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negligent operation of the vehicles by persons operating them with
the permission, express or implied, of the owners. If the relation
between owner and driver is not that of master-servant or principal-
agent, liability is limited to $5000 for one person and $10,000 for
more than one.
If "motor vehicles" be construed to include aircraft, a possible
construction, the section could apply to air transport companies, but
since in such case the imputed negligence would probably always
arise through the relationship of master and servant, the liability
would be unlimited.
C. 1. None.
2. Code of Civil Procedure (Deering, 1931), §§375, 376.
3. Such damages as under all the circumstances of the case may be
just.
COLORADO
A. Compiled Laws (1921), §6302: Provides that when a person shall die
from any injury caused by the negligence or criminal intent of the
driver or person in charge of a train, coach "or other public con-
veyance," the employer shall be liable for every person so killed
in a sum of between $3000 and $5000.
Denver & R. G. R. R. Co. v. Whan, 39 Colo. 230, 89 P. 39 (1907):
Pullman porter case: exemption valid. The language of the case
restricts the holding to the situation where the injured person is
not a "passenger," for example, probably, express messenger and
news agent cases. There are dicta to the effect that the exemption
would be invalid as to passengers for hire. No guess should be
hazarded as to free passengers.
C. 1. None.
2. Compiled Laws (1921), §§6303, 6304.
3. Such damages as are fair and just, with reference to the necessary
injury to the surviving parties who are beneficiaries under the act.
4. Not exceeding five thousand dollars.
CONNECTICUT
A. Griswold v. N. Y. & N. E. Rd. Co., 53 Conn. 371, 4 A. 261 (1885)
news agent case. (1) no exemption as to passenger for hire allow-
able; (2) exemption allowable as to free passenger, both as to
ordinary and gross negligence.
B. General Statutes (Revision of 1930), §3077: Provides that pilots and
their employers be responsible for damage to persons caused by
negligent operation of aircraft by such pilots.
C. 1. None.
2. General Statutes (Revision of 1930), §5987.
3. Just damages.
3. Not exceeding ten thousand dollars.
DELAWARE
A. Flinn v. Phil. W. & B. Ry. Co., 1 Houst. 649 (1858-drover's pass)
no exemption allowable.
Perry v. Phil. B. & W. Ry. Co., 1 Boyce 399, 77 A. 725 (1910-express
messenger) : (1) exemption allowable; (2) exemption good de-
fense in suit under death by wrongful act statute. Though the
cases are not clearly to this effect, it may be said that the exemp-
tion is good as against free, but not as against pay passengers.
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C. 1. None.
2. Revised Statutes (1915), §4155.
3. Damages for the death and loss occasioned by it.
FLORIDA
A. Compiled General Laws (1927), §7051: "A railroad company shall be
liable for any damage done to persons . . . by the running of the
locomotives, or cars or other machinery of such company, or for
damage done by any persort in the employ and service of sucli
company, unless the company shall make it appear that their agents
have exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence
Eubanks v. Southern Ry. Co., 244 Fed. 891 (D. C., Fla., 1917-Pullman
porter) : the statute (supra) merely declares the railroad's com-
mon law liability, and does not inhibit the right to contract as to
liability. The exemption here is valid.
There are no Florida state cases on point; the authority of this
case, therefore, is doubtful.
C. 1. None.
2. Compiled General Laws (1927), §§7047, 7048.
3. Such damages as may have been sustained by the persons entitled
to sue by reason of the death.
GEORGIA
A. Georgia Code (1933), 94-702: Provides that where a person is injured
by the negligence or improper conduct of a railroad company or
its servants, the company shall be liable notwithstanding any by-
laws, rules, regulations, or notices limiting its liability.
In Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Lipman, 110 Ga. 665, 36 S. E. 202 (1900),
it was held that a carrier of passengers for hire cannot exempt
itself from liability for its negligence. Defendant relied on a sec-
tion of the Code (2276, Code of 1895) prohibiting limitation of
liability by notice, but allowing it by express contract. The court
held that, in view of the common law definition of "common car-
rier," which was carried into the Code (§§2263, 2264, Code of
1895), the section referred only to carriers of goods. The statute
set out supra was not mentioned in the opinion, though it was
passed in 1855 (Acts 1855-6, p.. 155). In Wright v. Central of Ga.
Ry., 18 Ga. A. 290, 89 S. E. 457 (1916), an exemption in a free
pass was invalidated, under orders of the Railroad Commission
(3, 20) that such passes be governed by the Federal Hepburn Act(q. v.).
B. Georgia Code (1933), Ch. 11-107: Similar to Arizona §175z33.
C. 1. None.
2. Georgia Code (1933), Ch. 105-1302, 1306, 1307.
3. The full value of the life of the decedent.
4. None
IDAHO
B. Session Laws (1931), Ch. 100, §6: The liability of the owner of one
aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or pas-
sengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on land
or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law applicable
to torts on land.
C. 1. None.
2. Idaho Code Ann. (1932), Ch. 5-310, 311.
3. Such damages as under all the circumstances of the case may be-just.
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ILLINOIS
A. No exemption is allowable as against a passenger for hire, either for
ordinary or gross negligence. As to free passenger, express mes-
senger, and Pullman porter cases, exemption is valid, both as to
ordinary and gross negligence, but (possibly) not as to wilful
wrongs.
The Illinois rule evolved slowly. The first case (Ill. Cent. Rd. v. Read,
37 Ill. 485 (1865) involved a free pass; the court held the exemp-
tion valid as to ordinary, but not as to gross negligence or wilful
wrong. In Arnold v. Ill. Cent. Rd., 83 Ill. 273 (1876), plaintiff
had purchased a ticket for passage on a freight train. The court
held the exemption good as to ordinary negligence, but not as to
gross negligence or wilful wrong. But in Ill Cent. Rd. v. Beebe,
174 Ill. 13, 50 N. E. 1019 (1898), a case involving a drover's pass,
which the court held to be a ticket for consideration, the Arnold
case was overruled, and the exemption was held bad, both as to
ordinary and gross negligence, where the passage was not gratui-
tous. Although the particular case was governed by Iowa law,
the contract having been executed and was to be partly performed
there, the Illinois rule was nevertheless laid down. It is note-
worthy, that the Arnold case was not attempted to be distinguished
on its facts, as was possible, dealing, as it did, with passage on a
freight, instead of a passenger train. The Beebe case is still law
in Illinois. In Blank v. Ill. Cent. Rd., 182 Ill. 332, (1899), an
express messenger case, the court reaffirmed its view that an exemp-
tion is valid in a free passage case. This view was further re-
affirmed, both as to ordinary and gross negligence, in Chicago, R. I.
& Pac. v. Hamler, 215 Ill. 525, 74 N. E. 705 (1905), a Pullman
porter case, the court relying on Blank v. Illinois Cent. The court
there did away with the distinction between degrees of negligence
in Illinois, but retained the distinction between negligence and
wilful or intentional wrong. There is a possibility, therefore, that
exemptions from wilful wrong, even in free passage cases, will be
considered void.
C. 1. None.
2. Revised Statutes (Smith-Hurd, 1933), Ch. 70, §§1, 2.
3. Such damages as are a fair and just compensation with reference
to the pecuniary injuries resulting to the beneficiaries.
4. Not to exceed ten thousand dollars.
INDIANA
A. Burns' liidiana Statutes Ann. (1933), 55-1001: Provides that no com-
pany operating public passenger conveyances shall issue any tickets
containing any clause limiting or abridging its liability, unless the
clause be printed in nonpareil type or larger, but that this act shall
not be construed to change the law as to its right so to limit or
abridge its liability.
Same, 55-1008: Nor shall §1001 apply to special, half-fare, or ex-
cursion tickets.
The Indiana rule is well settled that as to a passenger for hire, no
exemption is valid, but as to all others, exemptions are valid. In
the first passenger case, Indiana Cent. Ry. v. Mundy, 21 Ind. 48
(1863), the court intimated that it would not classify degrees of
negligence, and the later decisions have not done so. In that case
(caretaker's pass), the court approved an intruction that there
would be no liability, because of the exemption, for any negligence,
unless it was "wilfully gross." But this holding was overruled
in Ohio & Miss. Rd. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 471 (1874), a drover's pass
case (same holding: Louisville, N. & C. Ry. v. Faylor, 126 Ind.
126, 25 N. E. 869 (1890)). But exemptions were held valid in
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Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. v. Keefer, 146 Ind. 21, 44 N. E. 796
(1896-express messenger) ; Russell v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L.
Rd., 157 Ind. 305, 61 N. E. 678 (1901-Pullman porter; reaffirmed
invalidity of exemption as to pay passenger) ; Payne v. Terre Haute
& I. Ry., 157 Ind. 616, 61 N. E. 422 (1902-free pass) ; and Cleve-
land, C. C. & St. L. Rd. v. Henry, 170 Ind. 94, 83 N. E. 710 (1908-
circus employee).
B. Burns' Indiana Statutes Ann. (1933), 14-106: The liability of the
owner of one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aero-
nauts or passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by col-
lision on land or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of
law applicable to torts on land.
C. 1. None.
2. Burns' Ind. Statutes Ann. (1933), 2-404.
3. No statement.
4. Not to exceed ten thousand dollars. If decedent leaves no widow,
widower, or dependent children or next of kin, recovery is lim-
ited to $850 in certain proportions for certain enumerated ex-
penses.
IOWA
A. Code of Iowa (1931), §8042: Prohibits railroad companies to exempt
themselves from their liability as carriers of passengers by any
contract, receipt, rule or regulation.
Rose v. Des Moines Valley Rd. Co., 39 Ia. 246 (1874): the statute(supra) applies to free passengers, as well as to passengers for
hire. A Federal court applied the statute in an express messenger
case: O'Brien v. Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co., 116 Fed. 502 (C. C. Ia.,
1902).
B. Code of Iowa (1931), §8043: Prohibits any corporation or person
engaged in transporting persons for hire to exempt themselves
from their liability as such carriers by any contract, receipt, rule
or regulation.
C. 1. None.
2. Code of Ia. (1931), §§10957, 11920.
KANSAS
A. Revised Statutes Ann. (1923), 66-173: No railroad company shall be
permitted, except as otherwise provided by regulation or order of
the commission, to change or limit its common law liability as a
common carrier.
Same, 66-234: Provides that railroads be liable for all damage done
to person or property by their negligence.
Same, 66-240: Provides that no common carrier shall attempt to
exempt itself from liability by any contract, rule, regulation or
device.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Posten, 59 Kan. 449, 53 P. 465 (1898) : a
provision in a drover's pass limiting liability to $1000 is invalid,
under the statute (supra).
Sewell v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 78 Kan. 1, 96 P. 1007 (1908):
exemption from liability for negligence against express messenger
is valid. The court did not even consider the statute involved in
the Posten case, which had not been repealed. Nevertheless, the
rule of the Sewell case probably applies to free passage and
Pullman porter cases. The correctness of the decision is doubtful,
in view of the statute.
C. 1. None.
2. Revised Statutes Ann. (1923), 60-3203.
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3. No statement.
4. Not to exceed ten thousand dollars.
KENTUCKY
A. Constitution of Kentucky, §196: No common carrier shall be per-
mitted to contract for relief from its common law liability.
Louisville & National Rd. v. Brown, 186 Ky. 435, 217 S. W. 686 (1919
-free pass) ; the constitutional provisions do not apply to the case
of a free pass. But a railroad cannot exempt itself from liability
for gross negligence. The court expressly refused to decide as to
exemption from ordinary negligence in free pass case. The rule
of this case seems to violate the intent of the constitutional pro-
visions cited herein.
C. 1. Section 241: "Whenever the death of a person shall result from
an injury inflicted by negligence or wrongful act, then, in every
such case, damages may be recovered for such death, from the
corporations and persons so causing the same."
2. Carroll's Kentucky Statutes (1930) §6.
3. Punitive damages may be recovered where the wrongful act was
wilful or grossly negligent.
4. None.
5. Constitution, §54: "The general assembly shall have no power to
limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death,
or for injuries to person or property."
LOUISIANA
A. Higgins v. New Orleans, M. & C. Rd. Co., 28 La. Ann. 133 (1876-
news agent) : exemption from loss caused by negligence is valid,
but not as to loss caused by fraudulent, wilful, or reckless mis-
conduct. Whether this rule applies to passenger for hire, quaere.
B. General Statutes (Dart, 1932), §§1, 2, 4: Provide that every com-
pany carrying person for hire by air execute an indemnity bond
with a surety company authorized to do business in the state in
favor of any person who may be injured by the operation of the
aircraft, or for his beneficiaries under the survival statute, tile
amount to be $15,000 for the first plane, and $1000 more for each
additional plane.
C. 1. None.
2. Civil Code (Dart, 1932), §2315.
3. Damages suffered both by the 'deceased and the survivors men-
tioned in the Act.
MAINE
A. Rogers v. Kennebec Steamboat Co., 86 Me. 261, 29 A. 1069 (1894-free
pass; ship) : exemption as to free passengers is allowable. But it
is not valid as to passengers for hire: Buckley v. Bangor & A. Rd.
Co., 113 Me. 164, 93 A. 65 (1915-caretaker) ; Miller v. Me. Central
Ry., 125 Me. 338, 133 A. 907 (1926-caretaker).
C. 1. None.
2. Revised Statutes (1930), Ch. 101, §§9, 10.
3. Such damages as may be fair and just with reference to the
pecuniary injuries resulting to the beneficiaries.
4. Not to exceed five thousand dollars.
MARYLAND
A. Exemption as to passenger for hire is invalid, but as to express mes-
sengers, Pullman porters, circus employees, etc., it is valid: West-
ern Md. Ry. Co. v. Shatzer, 142 Md. 274, 120 A. 840 (1923).
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B. Ann. Code of Md. (Bagby, 1924, Supp.), Art. IA, §6: The liability
of the owner of one aircraft to the owner of another'aircraft, or
to aeronauts or passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused
by collision on land or in the air, shall be determined by the rules
of law applicable lo torts on land.
Laws of Md. (1931), Ch. 403, §40: Provides that the liability of the
owner of aircraft engaged in interstate commerce for any loss in-
curred without his privity or knowledge be limited to the amount
or value of his interest in the aircraft "and her freight then pend-
ing." [This Act is copied from U. S. Code, Title 46, §183 (q. v.)
and may receive the construction, as that section has, that it applies
to injuries to passengers. But the surrounding sections of the
chapter are all directed towards the carriage of goods, and since
the working of this one is not entirely clear, the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis may be applied to limit it to the carriage of
goods.]
C. 1. None.
2. Annotated Code (Bagby, 1924), Art. 67, §§1, 2.
3. Such damages as may be proportioned to the injury resulting to
the beneficiaries.
MASSACHUSETTS
A. General Laws of Mass. (1932), Ch. 159, §3: Provides that no rule,
regulation, sign or other device shall prevent any passenger of any
common carrier who "enters or leaves by a door of its car or
train" from recovering damages for any injury.
Same, Ch. 229, §3: Provides that when the death of a passenger or
other person is caused by negligence of a railroad company, it
shall be punished by a fine of from $500 to $10,000, which goes to
the administrator of the estate, and shall also be liable in dam-
ages, in a sum of between $500 and $10,000.
Same, Ch. 229, §6: Provides for additional recovery of damages for
conscious suffering resulting from the injury: Gilpatrick v. Cot-
ting, 214 Mass. 426, 101 N. E. 993 (1913).
Exemptions from negligence are valid in cases of express messengers
(Bates v. Old Colony Rd., 147 Mass. 255, 17 N. E. 633 (1888)), free
passage (Quimby v. Boston & M. Rd. Co., 150 Mass. 365, 23 N. E.
205 (1890)), and circus employees (Robertson v. Old Colony Rd.,
156 Mass. 525, 31 N. E. 650 (1892)). But no exemption is valid
in the case of a non-gratuitous passenger (Doyle v. Fitchburg Rd.
Co., 166 Mass. 492, 44 N. E. 611 (1896). Though the court in the
Quimby case doubted whether the degrees of negligence idea should
be applied in Massachusetts, a dictum in the Doyle case indicated
that even in a free pass situation, an exemption as to wilful neg-
ligence would be invalid. Finally dictum in the Quimby case for-
bids limitation of liability for reduction in fare. Chapter 229, §3,
supra, would not apply in the first three cases, which were personal
injury actions, but was not even mentioned in the Doyle case, a
death action.
B. Gen. Laws of Mass. (1932), Ch. 229, §2: Provides for an action for
death caused by the negligence of a common carrier of passengers,
other than railroads, the limits of recovery, being a minimum of
$500 and a maximum 6Yf $5000.
C. 1. None.
2. General Laws (1932), Ch. 229, §§5, 6.
3. Damages to be assessed with reference to degree of culpability of
defendant or his wrong doing servants. Further damages for
the conscious suffering of the deceased may be recovered.
4. Not less than five hundred nor more than ten thousand dollars.
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5. General Laws (1932), Ch. 229, §1. Provides for death caused by a
defect, want of repair, or insufficient railing of a road or bridge,
the limit of recovery being $1000.
MICHIGAN
A. Compiled Laws of Mich. (1929), §§11197, 11198: Provide for an
action for death caused by the wrongful act of a railroad company.
As to transportation given by a railroad company in a capacity other
than that of a common carrier, exemptions from liability are valid
(Coup v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 56 Mich. 111 (1895-circus
employee)), but not as to wilful and wanton negligence (Sabol v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 255 Mich. 548, 238 N. W. 281 (1931-
circus employee)). The reason and the rule would probably apply
to all cases except drovers, caretakers, and paying passengers:
Weaver v. Ann Arbor Rd. Co., 139 Mich. 590,; 102 N. W. 1037(1905-drover; exemption invalid) ; Eberts v. Detroit, M. C. & M.
City Ry., 151 Mich. 260, 115,N. W. 43 (1908-non-gratuitous pas-
senger; exemption invalid):
B. Compiled Laws of Mich. (1929), §4816: The liability of the owner of
one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or
passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on land
or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law applicable to
torts on land.
C. 1. None.
2. Compiled Laws (1929), §§14061, 14062.
3. Such damages as may be fair and just, with reference to the pecun-
iary injury resulting from the death.
4. None.
MINNESOTA
A. No exemptions are allowable either as to free (Jacobus v. St. P. & C.
Ry. Co., 20 Minn. 125 (1873)) or paying passengers (Gerin v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 133 Minn. 395, 158 N. W. 630 (1916-
drover's pass)).
B. Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), §5494-12: The liability of the owner of
one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or
passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on
land or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law applicable
to torts on land.
C. 1. None.
2. Minn. Statutes (Mason, 1927), §9657.
3. No statement.
4. Not to exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars.
MISSISSIPPI
A. Miss. Code Ann. (1930), §6152: Provides that railroad companies be
liable for all damages to any person caused by the negligence of
their servants.
Exemptions from liability are not recognized in Mississippi. In Illinois
Cent. v. Grudup, 63 Miss. 302 (1882) it was held proper to exclude
from evidence a free pass on which a mail agent was riding. The
decision rested on two grounds: first, that there was no considera-
tion for the waiver; second, that such exemptions are against public
policy. In'Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Grant, 86 Miss. 565, 38 So. 502
(1905), the court relied on the Grudup case in excluding a free
pass, held by defendant's employee, from evidence, ruling that the
statement in the latter case as to free passengers was not dictum.
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C. 1. None.
2. Miss. Code Ann. (1930), §510.
3. Such damages as may be just, including all the damages of every
kind to the decedent and to the beneficiaries.
MISSOURI
A. Revised Stat. of Mo. (1929), §3262: Provides an action for death of
any person caused by wrongful acts of employees of public convey-
ance companies, or for death of passengers of such companies
caused by defects in the conveyance, minimum recovery to be
$2000 and maximum $10,000.
Same, §4829: Provides that no common carrier of persons or prop-
erty shall exempt itself from liability by any contract, receipt, rule,
notice or regulation.
Missouri refuses validity to exemptions from liability in any type of
case: Tibby v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 82 Mo. 292 (1884-drover's pass);
Jones v. St. L. S. W. Ry. Co., 125 Mo. 666, 28 S. W. 883 (1894-
Pullman porter); Powell v. Union Pac. Ry., 255 Mo. 420, 164 S. W.
.628 (1913-non-gratuitous passenger) ; Wentz v. Chicago, B. & Q.
Ry. Co., 259 Mo. 450, 168 S. W. 1166 (1914-free pass; liability
limited to $1000).
B. Rev. Statutes of Mo. (1929), §13908: The liability -of the owner of
one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or
passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on
land or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law applicable
to torts on land.
C. 1. None.
2. Revised Statutes (1929), §§3263, 3264.
3. Such damages as may be deemed fair and just, with reference to
the necessary injury to the beneficiaries, and having regard to
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances attending the ac-
cident.
4. Not to exceed ten thousand dollars.
MONTANA
A. Revised Code of Mont. (Choate, 1921), §7853: Provides that a com-
mon carrier cannot by contract exonerate itself from liability for
gross negligence, fraud, or wilful wrong.
In a free pass case (John v. No. Pac. Ry., 42 Mont. 18, 111 P. 632
(1910)), the court said that it was settled in Montana that a com-
mon carrier can exonerate itself from liability for ordinary neg-
ligence. Reliance was placed on a case involving chattels (Nelson
v. Great Northern Ry., 28 Mont. 297, 72 P. 642 (1903)), wherein
nothing was said as to passengers. Nevertheless, the language in
the case is broad enough to cover passage for consideration, as
well as gratuitous transportation. As to limitation of liability, a
dictum in Miley v. No. Pac. Ry., 41 Mont. 51, 108 P. 5 (1910) is
significant. That was not a personal injury case; plaintiff, travel-
ling on an excursion ticket, was carried past her station. The court
said: ". . . that, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a railway
company may for a reduced fare sell a particular form of ticket,
whereby its liability is restricted and its obligations curtailed, is
recognized by the authorities generally." It must be noted, how-
ever, that reliance was placed on only one case, and that case in-
volved liability for baggage: Rose v. No. Pac. Ry., 35 Mont. 70, 88
P. 767 (1907).
C. 1. None.
2. Revised Codes (Choate, 1921), §§9075, 9076.
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3. Such damages as under all the circumstances of the case may be
just.
NEBRASKA
A. Constitution of Neb., Art. X, §4: The liability of railroad corpora-
tions as common carriers shall never be limited.
Compiled Statutes of Neb. (1929), Ch. 74, §701: Provides that rail-
road companies be liable for injuries to passengers, unless caused
by the criminal negligence of the person injured or by his violation
of some rule or regulation of the railroad actually brought to his
attention.
Same, Ch. 74, §714: Provides that no notice shall limit the liability
of railroad companies unless it was actually brought to the pas-
senger's knowledge and assented to by him.
Exemptions in drover's pass cases are invalid: Omaha & R. V. Ry.
v. Crow, 47 Neb. 84 (1896). This is true also in circus employee
cases, in view of constitutional and statutory provisions requiring
railroads to provide transportation to everyone on equal terms:
Maucher v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 100 Neb. 237, 159 N. W. 422
(1916). Exemptions in free passes are also void: Chicago, R. I.
& P. Ry. v. Collier, 1 Neb. (unof.) 278, 95 N. W. 472 (1901). In
this case, the court construed the statutes cited above, and it was
held that no implication drawn from the wording of the latter
could be allowed to overcome the express command of the former.
C. 1. None.
2. Compiled Statutes (1929), Ch. 30, §§809, 810.
3. Damages sustained by the beneficiaries.
NEVADA
B. Nev. Compiled Laws (Hillyer, 1929), §280: The liability of the owner
of one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or
passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on
land or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law ap-
plicable to torts on land.
C. 1. None.
2. Compiled Laws (Hillyer, 1929), §§9194, 9195.
3. Such damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as may be deemed fair
and just, taking into consideration the pecuniary injury to the
beneficiaries.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
A. Exemption in case of non-gratuitous passage is not allowable: Baker
v. Boston & M. Ry., 74 N. H. 100, 65 A. 386 (1906-caretaker;
covenant not to sue). And, likewise, exemptions in free pass cases
are void: Wessman v. Boston & M. Ry., 84 N. H. 475, 152 A. 476
(1930). In this case, the court expressly refused to comment on
the rule in Pullman porter, express messenger and circus' cases,
but distinguished the free pass case in that the nature of the ser-
vice rendered in the former cases is exceptional, while in the latter,
nothing exceptional beyond mere transportation, is performed. The
distinction may be carried into rule. The court also intimates that
it would hold invalid exemptions from liability based on rate con-
cessions.
C. 1. None.
2. Public Laws (1926), Ch. 302, §§9, 11, 12, 13.
3. The mental and physical pain suffered by decedent, the reasonable
expenses occasioned his estate by the injury, the probable dura-
tion of his life but for the injury, his capacity to earn money,
other elements allowed by law may be considered.
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4. Not to exceed seven thousand dollars, unless decedent left a widow,
widower, minor children, or dependent father or mother, in
which case the maximum is ten thousand dollart.
NEW JERSEY
A. Exemptions in free pass cases (Kinney v. Cent. Rd. of N. J., 32 N. J.
L. 407 (1868), aff'd 34 N. J. L. 513 (1869)) and express messenger
cases (Sheridan v. New Jersey & N. Y. Ry., 104 N. J. L. 622, 141
A. 811 (1928-dictum)) are valid. But they are not valid in pas-
senger for hire cases, even where the passenger is riding on a half-
fare ticket (Sheridan case, supra).
B. New Jersey Laws, §§15-26: The liability of the owner of one air-
.craft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or pas-
sengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on land
or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law applicable to
torts on land.
C. 1. None.
2. Compiled Statutes (19i0), §7, p. 1907; §8, p. 1908.
3. Such damages as may be deemed fair and just with reference to
pecuniary injury resulting to the beneficiaries.
NEW MEXICO
A. New Mexico Statutes Ann. (1929), 36-101: Provides an action for the
death of any person caused by wrongful acts of employees of
public conveyance companies or for death of passengers of such
companies caused by defects in the conveyance, the maximum re-
covery being $7500 (as amended, Laws of 1931, ch. 19, §1).
C. 1. None.
2. New Mexico Statutes Ann. (1929) 36-102, 104.
3. Such damages, compensatory and exemplary, as' may be deemed
fair and just, taking into consideration the pecuniary injury
resulting to the beneficiaries, and also the mitigating and aggra-
vating circumstances attending the accident.
NEW YORK
A. The rules in New York were first formulated in four cases: Wells
v. N. Y. .C. Rd., 24 N. Y. 181 (1862) ; Perkins v. N. Y. C. Rd., 24
N. Y. 196 (1862) ; Smith v. N. Y. C. Rd., 24 N. Y. 222 (1862);
and Bissell v. N. Y. C. Rd., 25 N. Y. 442 (1862). The first two of
these were free pass cases, the last two, drover's pass cases. The
court at that time was composed of eight judges, and most of them
wrote opinions in these cases. There resulted a confusion that is
difficult to order; none of the decisions is clear cut. But they
may be summarized thus: (1) As to passenger for hire, fourjudges thought that no exemption whatever was allowable (Denio,
Davies, Sutherland and Wright); four more agreed that no ex-
emption from the results of one's own (that is, in the case of a
corporation, its major officers) wilful wrong-doing would be valid
(Gould, Allen, Smith and Selden (who included negligence of
such extreme degree as to be almost wilful) ; but three of these
maintained that the railroad could exempt itself from its own
ordinary negligence (Selden, Allen and Gould; Sutherland, Wright,
Denio, Davies and Smith contra) ; two of these three also argued
that the corporation could exempt itself from the negligence, of
whatever degree, of its servants (Allen and Gould), but five judges
disagreed (Smith not expressing himself on this point). (2) As
to free pass cases, two upheld the view that no exemption whatever
was allowable (Sutherland and Wright) ; all the rest agreed that
exemption from one's own wilful misfeasance was void, but six
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thought that exemption from liability for one's own ordinary neg-
ligence was good (Denio, Davies, E. Smith, Allen, Gould and
Selden, which last excluded negligence of such degree as to be
almost wilful) ; the same six were agreed that exemption from
liability for the negligence of whatever degree of one's servants
was allowable. To sum up, if actual count means anything, no
exemptions, either from liability for fault of one's self or one's
servants are valid as against paying passengers; as to free pas-
sengers, exemption from liability for one's servants' negligence
of any degree is allowable, as is exemption from liability for one's
own ordinary negligence, but not for one's own wilful tort. (3)
Four judges held that a drover is a free passenger (Gould, Smith,
Davies, Allen) ; three thought he is not (Wright, Denio, Suther-
land), and one was non-committal (Selden). (4) It is also inter-
esting to note that two judges were of the opinion that an ex-
emption would be valid if given in consideration of reduced rates(Gould, Selden); with this thought no judges disagreed, though
Sutherland (with whom Wright concurred) in making a point in
his dissent in the Wells case seemed tacitly to assume that such
exemption would be invalid. But many years later, in Anderson v.
Erie Rd., 223 N. Y. 277, 119 N. E. 557 (1918), the court (threejudges dissenting), following the reasoning of Gould and Selden,
settled the rule in New York that not only free passengers, but also
passengers for a reduced rate, may be carried without risk on the
part of the carrier. It should be noted that in Conklin v. Canadian-
Colonial Airways, 242 App. Div. 625 (1935), the rule was qualified
to this extent: a choice must be offered the passenger between full
fare and no risk, or part fare, assuming the risk.
C. 1. Article I, §18: "The right of action now existing to recover dam-
ages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated;
and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory
limitations.
2. Consolidated Laws (Cahill, 1930), Ch. 13, §§130, 132.
3. Such damages as may be deemed fair and just for injury resulting
to the beneficiaries.
NORTH CAROLINA
B. North Carolina Code Ann. (1931), s191(o) : The liability of the
owner of one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aero-
nauts, or passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by col-
lision on land or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law





N. C. Code Ann. (1931), §§160, 161.
Such damages as may be fair and just for the pecuniary injury
resulting from the death.
NORTH DAKOTA
A. Compiled Laws of N. D. (1913), §§6240, 6241: Provide that com-
mon carriers may limit their obligations by special contract, but not
as to negligence, fraud, or other wrongful act of themselves or
their servants.
B. Comp. Laws of N. D. (1913), §2971c6: The liability of the owner of
one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or
passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on
land or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law applicable
to torts on land.
C. 1. None.
2. Compiled Laws (1913), §§8321, 8322.
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3. Such damages as may be proportionate to the injury resulting to
the beneficiaries.
OHIO
A. In a drover's pass case, the court held that an exemption would be
void as to a passenger for consideration: Cleveland, P. & A. Rd.
v. Curran, 19 Ohio St. 1. (1869). There is broad language in an-
other case that might be interpreted as covering the rule as to free
passage: Knowlton v. Erie Rd. Co., 19 Ohio St. 260 (1869-free
pass). It was said: "It has been repeatedly held by this court,
that a common carrier cannot, in this State, even by express con-
tract, relieve himself from liability for injuries caused by his own
negligence or that of his servants, in the discharge of the duties
incident to his employment." But the court was probably referring
to carriage of property cases, which w,ould not be authority for
this type of situation. The particular controversy was decided
under New York law.
C. 1. Article I, §19a: "The amount of damages recoverable by civil
action in the courts for death caused by the wrongful act, neglect
or default of another shall not be limited by law."
2. Ann. Code (Baldwin's Throckmorton, 1934), §§10509-166, 167.
3. Such damages as may be proportionate to the pecuniary injuries
resulting to the beneficiaries.
OKLAHOMA
A. Oklahoma Statutes (1931), §§9254, 9255: Provide that a common
carrier can limit its obligations by special contract except as to
gross negligence, fraud or wilful wrong.
These statutes were applied in lissouri, K. & T. v. Zuber, 76 Okla.
146, 184 P. 452 (1919), holding an exemption in a free pass valid
except as to gross, wilful or wanton negligence.
C. I. Article 23, §7: "The right of action to recover damages for in-
juries resulting in death shall never be abrogated, and the amount
recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.
2. Okla, Statutes (1931), §570.
OREGON
A. Richmond v. Soothern Pac. Ry., 41 Ore. 54, 67 P. 947 (1902) : ex-
emption invalid as to passenger for hire, even though a reduced
fare is paid. There is an intimation that if privileges special to
the particular passenger were given (for example the privilege
of riding on a part of the train not designed or ordinarily used for
passengers) the exemption would be valid. The court also cited
favorably cases allowing exemptions in express messenger and
circus employee situations.
C. 1. None.
2. Ore. Code Ann. (1930), 5-703.
3. No statement.
4. Not to exceed ten thousand dollars.
PENNSYLVANIA
A. Pennsylvania has gone far in forbidding exemptions. Though the
first case was limited expressly to invalidating exemptions from
liability for gross negligence as to passengers for consideration
(Penn. Rd. v. McClosky's Adntr., 23 Pa. St. 526 (1854-drover's
pass)), the rule was soon extended to prohibit exemptions as to
ordinary negligence (Penn. Rd. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. St. 315 (1865
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-drover's pass; criticizing the New York rule)). A further ex-
tension to free pass cases soon followed: Penn. Rd. v. Butler, 55
Pa. St. 335 (1868). There was an intimation in Forepaugh v. Del.
etc. Rd. Co., 128 Pa. St. 217 (1889) that the exemption might be
valid in a circus employee case, but the statement was dictum, be-
cause the controversy was decided under New York law. And
whatever lingering doubt there was must have been settled in
Coleman v. Penn. Rd., 242 Pa. St. 304, 89 A. 87 (1913), a Pullman
porter case, where, in sweeping language, the exemption was in-
validated. Furthermore, exemption in consideration of reduced
fares was held void in Crary v. Lehigh Valley Rd., 203 Pa. St. 525,
53 A. 363 (1902).
B. Penn. Statutes Ann. (Purdon, 1930), Title 2, §§1472, 1473: Provide
that the liability of owners or pilots of aircraft for injury or death
to passengers shall be determined by rules of law applicable to
torts on lands or waters of the state.
C. 1. Article 3, §21: [Provides first for workmen's compensation acts]
"but in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the
amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for
injuries to persons or property, and in case of death from such
injuries, the right of action shall survive."
3. Penn. Statutes Ann. (Purdon, 1930), Title 12, §§1601, 1604.
3. Damages now usually recovered in such actions,- and in addition,
expenses incurred for medical and surgical care, and nursing of
decedent, and other expenses for which the deceased could have
recovered had he sued; also reasonable funeral expenses, if
plaintiff had paid or incurred such expenses.
RHODE ISLAND
B. Laws of 1929, Ch. 1435, §6: The liability of the owner of one aircraft
to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or passengers on
either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on land or in the
air, shall be determined by the rules of law applicable to torts on
land.
C. 1. None.
2. General Laws (1923), §4862.
SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Constitution of Sou!h Carolina, Art. 9, §3: All railroad, express,
canal and other corporations engaged in transportation for hire
• . . are common carriers in their respective lines of business, and
are subject to liability . . . as such. It shall be unlawful for any
such corporation to make any contract relieving it of its common
law liability or limiiting the same, in reference to the carriage of
passengers.
The question is still open whether this constitutional provision applies
to free pass cases. In Nickles v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., the ticket
purported to be a free pass; the trial court instructed that de-
fendant could not contract with a free passenger to escape liability
for more than ordinary negligence. The decision for plaintiff was
affirmed, but on the ground that this was not a free pass case. In
Carter v. So. Ry., 100 S. C. 403, 84 S. E. 999 (1914), a Pullman
porter case, the exemption was held void, but on the ground that
the situation was indistinguishable from the drover's cases, in
which cases most courts hold that the passage is for consideration.
B. Code of Laws of S. C. (1932), §7105: The liability of the owner of
one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or
passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on
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land or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law ap-
plicable to torts on land.
C. 1. None.
2. Code of Laws (1932), §§411, 412.
3. Such damages, including exemplary- damages if the wrongful act
was reckless, wilful or malicious, as may be proportioned to the
injury resulting to the beneficiaries.
SOUTH DAKOTA
A. Compiled Laws of S. D. (1929), §§1162-1163: Provide that a com-
mon carrier can limit its obligations by special contract, except as
to gross negligence, fraud, or wilful wrong.
The statutes were applied in Meuer v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Rd., 55
S. D. 568, 59 N. W. 945 (1894), a drover's pass case, in which the
exemption was held valid.
B. Comp. Laws of S. D. (1929), §8666-Q: The liability of the owner of
one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or
passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on
land or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law ap-
plicable to torts on land.
C. 1. None.
2. Compiled Laws (1929), §§2929, 2931.
3. Such damages as may be proportionate to the pecuniary injuries
resulting to the beneficiaries.
4. Not to exceed ten thousand dollars.
TENNESSEE
B. Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934), §2721: The liability of the owner
of one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts
or passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision
on land or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law ap-
plicable to torts on land.
C. 1. None.
2. Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934), §§8236, 8240.
3. Damages for the mental and physical suffering, loss of time, and
necessary expenses resulting to the decedent from his personal
injuries, and also the damages resulting to the beneficiaries.
TEXAS
A. Revised Civil Statutes, art. 4671: Provides that no contract between
the owner of any vehicle for transporting persons and the person
or company operating the same shall release either of the con-
tracting parties from liability for death of any person.
Same, Art, 4671(2): Provides for an action for death of any person
by the wrongful act of the owner or operator or its servants of any
vehicle for the conveyance of passengers.
In Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. McGown, 65 Tex. 640 (1886), an ex-
emption in a free pass was held void, and it was indicated that in
no case could a carrier absolve itself of the duties imposed on it
by law as a common carrier.
C. 1. Article XVI, §26: "Every person, corporation or company, that
may commit a homicide, through wilful act or omission, or gross
neglect, shall be responsible, in exemplary damages, [to certain
named persons]."
2. Revised Civil Statutes (1925), Arts. 4671(1) (2) (3), 4673, 4677.
LIMITATION OF PASSENGER LIABILITY
3. Such damages as may be proportionate to the injury resulting from
the death; and if the death was caused by wilful wrong or gross
negligence, exemplary damages may also be recovered.
UTAH
A. Saunders v. Southern Pac. Ry., 13 Utah 275,44 P. 932 (1896) : drover's
pass; exemptions invalid as to passengers for hire. Williams v.
Ore. Short Line Rd., 18 Utah 210, 54 P. 991 (1898): passenger for
consideration; exemption held invalid; dictum that exemption would
be void in free pass case.
B. Revised Statutes of Utah (1933), 4-0-6: The liability of the owner of
one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or
passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on
land or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law ap-
plicable to torts on land.
C. 1. Article XVI, §5: "The right of action to recover damages for
injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the
amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limita-
tion [except in workmen's compensation acts]."
2. Revised Statutes (1933), 104-3-10, 11.
3. Such damages as under all the circumstances of the case may be
just.
VERMONT
A. Sprigg's Admr. v. Rutland Rd., 77 Vt. 347, 60 A. 143 (1904): ex-
emption invalid as to passengers for hire, such as, here, a drover.
But exemption is valid in an express messenger case: Robinson v.
St. Johnsbury & L. C. Rd.. 80 Vt. 129, 66 A. 814 (1905).
B. Public Laws (1933) §5227: The liability of the owner of one aircraft
to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or passengers on
either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on land or in the
air, shall be determined by the rules of law applicable to torts on
land.
C. 1. None.
2. Public Laws (1933), §§2859, 2860.
3. Such damages as are just, with reference to the pecuniary injuries
resulting to the beneficiaries.
VIRGINIA
A. Virginia Code of 1930, §3930: No agreement made by a transporta-
tion company for exemption from liability for injury or loss oc-
casioned by its own neglect or misconduct as a common carrier
shall be valid.
Under this statute, an exemption in a free pass case was held void:
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Tanner, 100 Va. 379, 41 S. E. 721 (1902).
Whether the statute would be extended to the ordinary express
messenger case was not decided in Shannon's Admr. v. Chesapeake
& 0. Rd., 104 Va. 645, 52 S. E. 376 (1905), because the contract
there was bipartite, being merely between the express company
and its employee; the court distinguished it on that ground from
Baltimore & 0. S. W. Ry. v. Voight (q. v. infra in "Federal), in
refusing to give effect to the exemption.
C. 1. None.
2. Code of 1930, §§5786, 5787.
3. Such damages as may be fair and just.
4. Not to exceed ten thousand dollars.
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WASHINGTON
A. Muldoon v. Seattle City Ry., 7 Wash. 528, 35 P. 422 (1893) : exemption
invalid as to paying passenger, but valid as to free passenger.
C. 1. None.
2. Revised Statutes Ann. (Remington, 1932), Ch. 4, §183.




2. Code of 1932, §§5474, 5475.
3. Such damages as may be deemed fair and just.
4. Not to exceed ten thousand dollars.
WISCONSIN
A. Wisconsin Statutes (1933), 192-43: Voids any contract, receipt, rule
or regulation exempting a carrier of persons for hire from liability.
Annas v. Milwaukee & N. Rd., 67 Wis. 46, 30 N. W. 282 (1896) : ex-
emption good in free pass case, except as to gross negligence.
Peterson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 119 Wis. 197, 96 N. W. 532
(1903): exemption valid in express messenger case. Feldschneider
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 122 Wis. 423, 99 N. W. 1034 (1904):
both complete exemption and limited liability provisions in a con-
tract with a passenger for hire are void (drover's pass case).
B. Wisc. Statutes (1933), 114.06: The liability of the owner of one air-
craft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or pas-
sengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on land
or in the air, shall be determined by the rules of law applicable to
torts on land.
C. 1. None.
2. Wisconsin Statutes (1933), 331-03, 04(1) (2).
3. Such damages as may be deemed fair and just in reference to the
pecuniary injury resulting from the death.
4. Not to exceed twelve thousand five hundred dollars; an additional
sum, not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars, may be
given for loss of society and companionship to the parent or
parents, or husband or wife of deceased.
WYOMING
C. 1. Article 10, §4: "No law shall be enacted limiting the amount of
damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any
person."
2. Revised Statutes (1931), 89-403, 404.
3. Such damages as may seem fair and just.
FEDERAL
A. United States Code, Title 46, §183: Provides that the liability of a
ship-owner for injury incurred without his privity or knowledge
be limited to the amount or value of his interest in the vessel and
her freight then pending.
Same, Title 46, §491: Provides that if a passenger of a vessel is in-jured by neglect or failure to comply with the provisions of certain
acts (Ch. 14 & 15, and §§214 and 215), or through any known
defects in the ship or its apparatus, the master and owner shall
be liable for the full amount of damage, and if through the wrong-
ful act of an employee, that employee shall be so liable.
LIMITATION OF PASSENGER LIABILITY
Section 183, supra, applies to passengers as well as goods: Butler v.
Boston & S. S. Co., 130 U. S. 527, 9 S. Ct. 612 (1889) ; Craig v.
Continental Ins. Co., 141 U. S. 638, 12 S. Ct. 97 (1891). But §183
does not conflict with §491. The former allows limitation where
the owner was without "privity or knowledge" of the wrongful
act; the latter excepts from §183 the case where precautions pre-
scribed in the Act are not taken, or where the defect is known;
then, the fault would be that of the owner: Butler case, supra.
And even then, the court said, if the non-compliance with the Act
were without the owner's fault, privity, or knowledge, §183 might
govern.
The question of the right of a railroad to contract for exemptions
from liability is a question of general law, on which Federal courts
will follow their own judgment (Chicago, M. & St. P. Rd. v. Solan,
169 U. S. 133, 18 S. Ct. 289 (1898) ; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood,
84 U. S. 357 (1873)). But as to intrastate transportation, the local
rule will be followed (New York Cent. Ry. v. Mohney, 252 U. S.
152, 40 S. Ct. 287 (1920)). In absence of Federal legislation, the
states can legislate on this subject, even as to interstate transpor-
tation, as far as accidents happening within their own territory are
concerned, and Federal courts will apply the state statutes (Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. v. Solan, supra). But Congress has legislated on
the subject of free passes, and also drover's passes, in interstate
commerce, prohibiting their issue except in specified cases (Hepburn
Act, 34 Stat. 584, §1); and although that act says nothing about
limitation of liability, Congress has, by its passage, assumed Fed-
eral jurisdiction' over the whole subject of free passes, and the
Federal rule applies, notwithstanding state statutes (Charleston &
West. Car Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 234 U. S. 576, 34 S. Ct. 964 (1914) ;
Kansas City So. Ry. v. VanZant, 260 U. S. 459, 43 S. Ct. 776 (1923),
rev'g. 289 Mo. 163, 232 S. W. 696 (1921)).
Exemptions from liability in cases of passengers for consideration are
invalid (Railway Co. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655 (1877)). Stock
drovers are considered to be passengers for consideration, so that
no exemption as to them is valid (Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, supra).
Nor has the Hepburn Act, by including drovers among the list of
those to whom "free" passes can be issued changed the rule, for
"free" must be taken in its historical sense, and in the case of
drovers, though their passes were spoken of as being "free," they
never were so in fact (Norfolk So. Rd. Co. v. Chatman, 244 U. S.
276, 37 S. Ct. 499 (1917)). (An apparently inconsistent case should
be noted. In Charleston & West. Car Ry. Co. v. Thompson, supra,
a free pass containing an exemption clause, was issued, under §1
of the Hepburn Act, to the wife of a railroad employee. The Court
of Appeals held the pass to be in reality not free, but issued as
part of the consideration for the employee's services, and the stip-
ulation therefore to be not binding. This was reversed on appeal;
Justice Holmes, writing the opinion of the court, admitted that in
absence of statute, the pass would not have been gratuitous, but
being included in §1 of the Hepburn Act, must be considered free.)
Exemptions in express messenger transportation contracts are valid
(Baltimore & 0. S. W. Ry. v. Voigt, 176 U. S. 498, 20 S. Ct. 385
(1900)), as they are in Pullman porter cases (Robinson v. Balti-
more & Ohio Rd., 237 U. S. 84, 35 S. Ct. 491 (1915)). Further-
more, exemptions are valid in cases where plaintiff is riding on a
free pass (Northern Pac. Ry. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440, 24 S. Ct.
408 (1904)). But it seems that even in a free pass case, the
exemption will not be extended to wilful or wanton misconduct
(New York Cent. Ry. v. Mohney, supra (gross negligence alleged) ;
the transportation was held by the majority to be intrastate, and
thus local law applied, but Justice Clarke went on to mention the
rule just stated; Justices Day and Van Devanter concurred in the
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
statement of the rule, but thought that interstate transportation was
involved. It is to be noted that no Ohio case speaks of any dis-
tinction in the rules applicable to ordinary and wilful negligence.
And the Lockwood case repudiated the degrees of negligence
formula).
Exemptions are also valid in circus employee cases: Clough v.
Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co., 155 Fed. 81 (C. C. A.-6, 1907). Contra:
Sager v. No. Pac. Ry., 166 Fed. 526 (C. C. Minn., 1908). (The
court emphasized the fact that this was a bipartite contract, between
the railroad and circus companies. This was true also in the Clough
case. It also construed a statute of North Dakota, where the in-jury occurred (providing that railroads be liable for all damage
done to any of its employees, or "by the mismanagement of its
engineers or other employees, to any person," no exemption con-
tract to be valid), as applying only to defendant's employees. The
quoted clause was disregarded in the opinion.) The exemption in
a circus employee case will not be extended to wilful and wanton
negligence: McCree v. Davis, 280 Fed. 959 (C. C. A.-6, 1922-
relying on New York Cent. Ry. v. Mohney, supra).
B. Warsaw Convention (ratified June 15, 1934), Art. 22(1): "In the
transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each
passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs.
Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger
may agree to a higher limit of liability." .
Same, Art. 23: "Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of lia-
bility or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this
Convention shall be null and void."
Same, Art. 25(1), (2) : Provide that article 22(1-) shall not apply as
to wilful misconduct of the carrier or its agents.
C. 1. None.
2. U. S. Code (1926), Title 46, §§761, 762 (death occurring on the
high seas).
3. Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the
beneficiaries.
4. It is possible that §183 of Title 46 (See A) may limit liability to
the value of the interest of the owner in the vessel. There is no
direct holding to this effect, but in Matter of the Petition of East
River Towing Co., 266 U. S. 368, 45 S. Ct. 115 (1924), it was held
that §183 applied to actions for death of a seaman, under Title 46,
§688, a section stating no limitation on the amount of recovery.
